Renaud Lambert

Journaliste au Monde diplomatique


  • Federal Police Indicts Marcelo Odebrecht and 4 More Executives on Suspicion of Corruption - 21/07/2015
    http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/internacional/en/brazil/2015/07/1658371-petrobras-scandal-federal-police-indicts-marcelo-odebrech

    Relire l’enquête d’Anne Vigna (octobre 2013) : « Odebrecht, multinationale dorlotée par l’Etat – Les Brésiliens aussi ont leur Bouygues »

    « En juin 2013, le mécontentement social conduisait les Brésiliens à manifester en masse dans les rues du pays. Parmi leurs cibles, les inégalités, des conditions de transport indignes, la corruption et... la multinationale Odebrecht : aux yeux de beaucoup, l’entreprise incarne les dérives d’un capitalisme de connivence. »
    http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2013/10/VIGNA/49721


    • Venezuela’s currency has fallen so much so quickly that a dollar now buys 100 times as many bolivars in the black market as it does at the government-controlled rate.

      The bolivar fell to a record 630.21 per dollar Tuesday in the illegal street markets where Venezuelans go to skirt limits on foreign-exchange purchases, compared with the official rate of 6.3 per dollar, data compiled by dolartoday.com show. The local currency has plunged 88 percent in the unofficial market over the past year and 34 percent in just the past month.

      Inflation is the fastest in the world as President Nicolas Maduro’s administration prints more currency to pay budget expenses. Because of tumbling oil prices, the government gets fewer dollars from its exports and there’s a shortage of greenbacks, pushing Venezuelans to the black market when they can’t obtain government approval to access the legal rates. Venezuela has maintained strict currency controls since 2003.

      Extrait de l’article de Ladan Cher dans le Diplo :

      Les motivations pour spéculer sur le marché noir du dollar sont donc nombreuses. Encore faut-il pouvoir mettre la main sur le billet vert. Franz von Bergen, journaliste pour le quotidien d’opposition El Nacional, nous présente les diverses méthodes pour obtenir la précieuse devise : « Il y a d’un côté les mille et une façons par lesquelles des personnes issues des classes populaires ou moyennes retirent les devises auxquelles elles ont droit pour voyager et les revendent, discrètement. Mais il y a aussi des combines beaucoup plus structurées, impliquant des entreprises importatrices ou de hauts fonctionnaires ayant accès aux agences de change officiel. Eux déplacent des sommes immenses. »

      Les spéculateurs s’emploient à louvoyer dans le labyrinthe des contrôles mis en place par le gouvernement. Officiellement, la seule façon d’obtenir des dollars consiste à passer par le Centre national de commerce extérieur (Cencoex). L’agence vend des bolivars en appliquant divers taux selon leur usage : les entreprises produisant de la nourriture ou des médicaments ont par exemple accès au cours de 6,3 bolivars par dollar, le cours officiel le plus bas.


  • Vers un césarisme européen, par Cédric Durand et Razmig Keucheyan (Le Monde diplomatique, novembre 2012)
    http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2012/11/DURAND/48383

    Ainsi, depuis le début de la crise, l’Union européenne n’a cessé de manifester les caractéristiques d’un régime autoritaire. Gouvernements élus contraints à la démission et remplacés par des technocrates sans légitimité démocratique ; prééminence d’institutions supposées « neutres », comme la BCE ; effacement du rôle du Parlement européen, dont le président social-démocrate allemand, M. Martin Schulz, essaie en vain de faire reconnaître le rôle (5) ; annulation de référendums ; intrusions du secteur privé dans la prise de décision politique… Pour comprendre cette dynamique antidémocratique, que seul pourrait renverser un mouvement social d’ampleur à l’échelle du continent, il n’est pas inutile de se tourner vers un contemporain de Freud, lui aussi observateur perspicace de la crise de civilisation des années 1930 : Antonio Gramsci.



  • Magnifique démontage des tribunes anti-Syriza publiées par le « Financial times »

    The FT Lets Itself Down Again : Francesco Giavazzi on Greece — Bull Market — Medium
    https://medium.com/bull-market/the-ft-lets-itself-down-again-francesco-giavazzi-on-greece-92988bc675eb
    https://d262ilb51hltx0.cloudfront.net/max/920/1*hQvROdXCWbeswrHv1Yh3jg.jpeg

    The FT Lets Itself Down Again: Francesco Giavazzi on Greece
    Is this Italy’s answer to Hans-Werner Sinn?

    Francesco tells Greece to take a hike.
    With regular opinion pieces from the likes of Hans-Werner Sinn and Niall Ferguson, the Financial Times op-ed page is developing an unfortunate reputation for publishing rubbish on economics. This new article on Greece from Italian professor, Francesco Giavazzi, (“Greeks chose poverty, let them have their way”) perhaps tops the lot with its combination of inaccuracy and unfortunate national stereotyping.

    Giavazzi reckons that after “Five years of negotiations that have achieved virtually nothing” the EU would be better off without Greece. He argues that the EU’s focus on Greece has distracted from other issues and concludes

    “But the euro cannot be a substitute for further political integration. Indeed, without such integration, the euro cannot survive — and today, Greece stands in the way of it.”
    I want to offer a few comments on Giavazzi’s piece, starting with his claim about few reforms being achieved in the past five years.

    No Progress in Five Years? Public Employment

    Giavazzi’s analysis of the past few years in Greece is as follows:

    “Five years of negotiations that have achieved virtually nothing (the few reforms that had been adopted, like a small reduction in the inflated number of public sector employees, have since been reversed by the Syriza-lead coalition). It is pretty clear that the Greeks have no appetite for modernising their society. They worry too little about an economy ruined by patronage.”
    Let’s first examine the one specific claim in Giavazzi’s article, that the reduction in public sector employees was small and has been reversed. The European Commission’s report on Greece from last year contains the following table on Greek public employment.

    Total public sector employment declined from 907,351 in 2009 to 651,717 in 2014, a decline of over 255,000. That is a drop of over 25%. Can this really be said to be a “small reduction”?

    And the reversal under Syriza? Reports on the new government’s rehiring plan say it may hire “as many as 15,000” workers, a tiny figure compared to previous reductions. Either Giavazzi doesn’t know the figures or he is playing fast and loose with them.

    No Progress in Five Years? Fiscal Deficits

    A theme that runs through commentary such as Giavazzi’s is the Greek people have no stomach for hard decisions. One has to wonder whether people who think this are conscious of even the basic facts about the scale of fiscal adjustment experienced in Greece. See below for a table from the OECD showing public deficits around the world. Greece has reduced its fiscal deficit from 15.6 percent of GDP in 2009 to 2.5 percent in 2014, a scale of deficit reduction not seen anywhere else in the world.

    This reduction involved massive cuts to public expenditure and was achieved against the background of a steadily shrinking economy. Professor Giavazzi is associated with the idea that severe fiscal contractions can be expansionary. Well the experiences of Greece and other countries have firmly discredited that idea. The Greek people have had to endure an extraordinarily harsh number of years and its governments have taken many tough decisions. They deserve better than to be trolled in the opinion pages of the FT.

    No Progress in Five Years? Structural Reforms

    Ah yes, but what about the all-important “structural reforms” beloved of every Eurocrat? Greece is famous for its anti-business red tape promoted by vested interests. Presumably nothing has been done about this. Well, Prof. Giavazzi may believe almost nothing has happened but there is concrete evidence that the Greek government has undertaken reforms in this area that will help to promote growth. The 2010 Doing Business report ranked Greece as the 109th best country in the world in which to do business, an extremely low ranking. The 2015 report ranked Greece 61st, a rise of 48 places.

    This still leaves Greece near the very back of the pack of European countries and there are many areas where there are opportunities for improvement. But to say there has been no improvement at all is simply incorrect.

    No Progress in Five Years? Pension Reforms

    What about pensions? Stories about Greeks retiring early appear to have had a major impact on the hard-line attitude of the German public towards Greece over the past few years. Pension reform is still a focus of the current negotiations between Greece and its creditors but this is another area where the widespread perception that there has been no reform is untrue.

    Greek governments have introduced a number of long-term reforms to their pension system in recent years. See pages 39 to 40 of the European Commission’s 2015 Ageing Report for a description of these reforms.

    The report also explains the long-run impact of pension reforms that have been legislated throughout the EU. The graph below is taken from the report. The blue line shows the average age of retirement in 2060 if there were no pension reforms and the red line shows the average age at retirement under current legislated systems. Greece (marked as EL) goes from one of the lowest average retirement ages under no reform to one of the highest after the reform. In this sense, Greece has undertaken the most significant pension reform in Europe (and it has not been repealed by the courts, as happened in Italy to pension reforms passed by Mario Monti’s government.)

    Again, this is an area where more reforms are almost certainly in the wider interest. Whatever about the longer run, current activity rates among older age groups in Greece are very low and steps need to be taken to adjust pension entitlements to address this issue. But the idea that no substantive reforms have taken place is false.

    Indeed, overall, you can credibly argue that Greece’s governments have achieved more substantive reform in recent years than the post-Berlusconi governments have managed in Italy or Mariano Rajoy has managed in Spain.

    Greece as a Political Problem

    Giavazzi suggests that the European Union may be better off without Greece partly because it causes serious political problems. But the political problems he cites seem fairly odd.

    The first is that Greece has been a distraction.

    “European leaders, instead of devoting their summits to the question of how to best defend our economic and military interests, agonise over what to do about Greece.”
    This is the can’t-walk-and-chew-gum-at-the-same-time school of political thought. Can anyone honestly argue that the EU’s enormous foreign policy and military structures would have come up with a better approach to Putin’s Russia or ISIS if only they had squeezed Greece off the agenda at some EU summits?

    The second is that Greece “stands in the way” of required further European political union. I’m not sure how it’s doing that. But even if it was, there are far larger obstacles to greater European political union, like the fact that most European citizens have no interest in more treaties bringing ever-closer union. The euro area is not, and probably never will be, anything close to an opimal currency area and blaming feckless Greeks for the euro’s problems is delusional.

    Worth noting as a counterpoint is that given Greece’s neighbourhood of the world (close to Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo, Turkey, Cyprus, North Africa and the Middle East) I’m pretty sure international affairs boffins could think of some good reasons to keep the country in the EU.

    Giavazzi’s Offer to Greece: All Carrot and No Stick

    The strangest part of Giavazzi’s article is his proposed offer to Greece. It’s a carrot and stick approach that turns out to be all carrot.

    Giavazzi recognises that Greek debts to the EU are unsustainable and (as best I can tell) seems to call for a complete write-off:

    “Since Athens joined the monetary union, we have lent Greece €400bn, 1.7 times the country’s gross domestic product in 2013. It is time for a reality check: they will never be repaid. And it is an illusion to imagine, as the Finns sometimes do, that we could receive compensation in kind by acquiring a few Greek islands. The age when the British empire would do that is, luckily, over. Bygones are bygones. The sooner we accept this and forget those loans the better.”
    Ok, so let’s imagine that happens. The Eurozone governments write off their loans to Greece. Given that the vast majority of Greece’s public debt is owed to these governments, this would slash its debt-GDP ratio to well below the Eurozone average.

    This is why Giavazzi’s stick doesn’t make sense. Having written off most of Greece’s debt, his stick is the following.

    “But it is not for the rest of Europe to impose reforms on Greece. It should merely make crystal clear that without serious reforms, new official loans are over. The only way for Athens to borrow will be to convince the markets that it will pay its own bills.”
    Giavazzi may imagine that a country that has just had most of its debts written off and that is close to having a primary balance won’t have any takers in the sovereign bond market because they are not doing enough reforms. But this isn’t how the world works. If bond markets will lend in large quantities to the likes of Brazil and Mexico, a post-write-off Greece should have no problem borrowing.

    So Giavazzi is wrong that “European leaders should stop treating the Greek problem as if it were merely a financial issue.” Write off Greece’s debt and there will be no more programmes, no more demands for reform, no Grexit and no more time taken up at EU summits. In the context of EU GDP, the price to pay for this is fairly small. But it’s not a price European leaders are willing to pay, partly because of the precedent it may set.

    This is very much a financial issue, albeit one where politics now largely prevents cold-eyed economic calculation from deciding what needs to be done.

    Grexit Complacency

    Albeit that his grand plan to get Greece to leave the euro (offer to write off all their debts and then demand reforms …) wouldn’t actually achieve its goal, Giavazzi’s complancency about the prospect of Greece leaving the euro (and possibly the EU — nobody really knows how this stuff would work) is a telling indication of the state of mind of much of Europe’s policy commentariat. He reckons that

    “thanks to the actions of the European Central Bank, monetary union today is resilient enough to withstand Grexit.”
    Which actions of the ECB? The never-used never-tested OMT? Bank stress tests? The “whatever it takes to preserve the euro” commitment? Well, when Cyprus had its crisis in 2013, whatever-it-takes did not go as far as ensuring that free movement of capital was maintained within the euro area. And if whatever-it-takes doesn’t prevent a Greek exit, there would be serious questions about what kind of euro the ECB was actually willing to bother preserving. If Greece could leave, then so could any country if the conditions were right.

    Someone told me on Twitter last night that nobody in financial markets was worried about Greece leaving the euro causing any contagion. That made me feel so much better because financial markets are never wrong or change their mind, right?

    A useful datapoint to conclude with: Francesco Giavazzi was very enthusiastic about the decision to let Lehman Brothers go bankrupt. If he liked that so much, I suspect he’ll love Grexit.



  • Greece has nothing to lose by saying no to creditors - FT.com

    If Greece were to default on all of its official-sector debt, France and Germany alone would stand to lose some €160bn. Angela Merkel and François Hollande would go down as the biggest financial losers in history. The creditors are rejecting any talks about debt relief now, but that may be different once Greece starts to default. If they negotiate, everybody would benefit. Greece would stay in the eurozone, since the fiscal adjustment to service a lower burden of debt would be more tolerable. The creditors would be able to recoup some of their otherwise certain losses."

    http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5e38f1be-1116-11e5-9bf8-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3d7NQYjgd
    http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/147194da-64a0-464d-a194-94e139bda2fb.img

    TEXTE COMPLET :

    So here we are. Alexis Tsipras has been told to take it or leave it. What should he do?
    The Greek prime minister does not face elections until January 2019. Any course of action he decides on now would have to bear fruit in three years or less.

    First, contrast the two extreme scenarios: accept the creditors’ final offer or leave the eurozone. By accepting the offer, he would have to agree to a fiscal adjustment of 1.7 per cent of gross domestic product within six months.
    My colleague Martin Sandbu calculated how an adjustment of such scale would affect the Greek growth rate. I have now extended that calculation to incorporate the entire four-year fiscal adjustment programme, as demanded by the creditors. Based on the same assumptions he makes about how fiscal policy and GDP interact, a two-way process, I come to a figure of a cumulative hit on the level of GDP of 12.6 per cent over four years. The Greek debt-to-GDP ratio would start approaching 200 per cent. My conclusion is that the acceptance of the troika’s programme would constitute a dual suicide — for the Greek economy, and for the political career of the Greek prime minister.
    Would the opposite extreme, Grexit, achieve a better outcome? You bet it would, for three reasons. The most important effect is for Greece to be able to get rid of lunatic fiscal adjustments. Greece would still need to run a small primary surplus, which may require a one-off adjustment, but this is it.
    Greece would default on all official creditors — the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Stability Mechanism, and on the bilateral loans from its European creditors. But it would service all private loans with the strategic objective to regain market access a few years later.
    The second reason is a reduction of risk. After Grexit, nobody would need to fear a currency redenomination risk. And the chance of an outright default would be much reduced, as Greece would already have defaulted on its official creditors and would be very keen to regain trust among private investors.
    The third reason is the impact on the economy’s external position. Unlike the small economies of northern Europe, Greece is a relatively closed economy. About three quarters of its GDP is domestic. Of the quarter that is not, most comes from tourism, which would benefit from devaluation. The total effect of devaluation would not be nearly as strong as it would be for an open economy such as Ireland, but it would be beneficial nonetheless. Of the three effects, the first is the most important in the short term, while the second and third will dominate in the long run .
    Grexit, of course, has pitfalls, mostly in the very short term. A sudden introduction of a new currency would be chaotic. The government might have to impose capital controls and close the borders. Those year-one losses would be substantial, but after the chaos subsides the economy would quickly recover.
    Comparing those two scenarios reminds me of Sir Winston Churchill’s remark that drunkenness, unlike ugliness, is a quality that wears off. The first scenario is simply ugly, and will always remain so. The second gives you a hangover followed by certain sobriety.
    So if this were the choice, the Greeks would have a rational reason to prefer Grexit. This will, however, not be the choice to be taken this week. The choice is between accepting or rejecting the creditors’ offer. Grexit is a potential, but not certain, consequence of the latter.
    If Mr Tsipras were to reject the offer and miss the latest deadline — the June 18 meeting of eurozone finance ministers — he would end up defaulting on debt repayments due in July and August. At that point Greece would still be in the eurozone and would only be forced to leave if the ECB were to reduce the flow of liquidity to Greek banks below a tolerable limit. That may happen, but it is not a foregone conclusion.
    The eurozone creditors may well decide that it is in their own interest to talk about debt relief for Greece at that point. Just consider their position. If Greece were to default on all of its official-sector debt, France and Germany alone would stand to lose some €160bn. Angela Merkel and François Hollande would go down as the biggest financial losers in history. The creditors are rejecting any talks about debt relief now, but that may be different once Greece starts to default. If they negotiate, everybody would benefit. Greece would stay in the eurozone, since the fiscal adjustment to service a lower burden of debt would be more tolerable. The creditors would be able to recoup some of their otherwise certain losses.
    The bottom line is that Greece cannot really lose by rejecting this week’s offer.



  • Pour les investisseurs, le Grexit s’avère moins inquiétant que la perspective d’une réussite de Syriza

    “Debt restructuring in Greece could potentially inflame the anti-austerity sentiment that is establishing itself in other parts of the Eurozone, namely Spain and this is becoming a worry for Europe’s leaders,” said Angus Campbell, senior analyst at FX Pro.

    Greek stocks suffer further pummelling - FT.com
    http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0c45e4ee-10d9-11e5-8413-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cpso4LB9
    http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/434f65bd-cbbf-4b39-8152-88d1d13428a2.img




  • Greece’s prime minister on Friday told restive MPs he could not accept the “absurd” and “irrational” bailout proposal put forward by the country’s creditors as he sought to quell a rising political backlash over the terms of a possible deal.

    Tsipras dismisses ‘absurd’ creditors’ offer as Greek markets slide - FT.com
    http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/82aefd0a-0b70-11e5-994d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3cImwpI3s
    http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/05012116-b87e-49dd-8f08-c7c45e5f70a9.img


  • Tension au sein de Syriza :

    Details of [Tsipras’] counterproposal to the creditors’ bailout deal were published on the website of the German daily Der Tagesspiegel, showing that — despite public pronouncements — Mr Tsipras was prepared to accept budget targets that would likely require significant new austerity measures.

    Tsipras to address parliament on Friday as opposition mounts - FT.com
    http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/499e2286-0a97-11e5-a8e8-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3c6qW44LR
    http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/4bd9d3aa-a510-4847-b32f-4eef4a7b8f94.img






  • Réaction de Stathis Kouvélakis à la tribune d’Alexis Tsipras dans Le Monde de ce week-end.

    Cette tribune d’Alexis Tsipras est à bien des égards importante.
    Elle signale qu’un seuil qualitatif a été franchi dans la situation greque, et cela pour plusieurs raisons.
    Tout d’abord, il permet de lister pour la première fois, y compris pour le lecteur grec, les concessions que le gouvernement grec a déjà accepté au cours des « négociations ». Et la liste est impressionnante : excédents budgétaires, abandon de fait de le revendication d’effacement de la dette (il n’est même pas mentionné dans ce texte) hausse de la TVA, report à plus tard de la hausse du SMIG et du rétablissement des conventions collectives, réformes des retraites visant à faire des économies, taxes sur le foncier entérinées.
    A cela il faut ajouter un point essentiel : comme le précise la version grecque, le « renforcement de l’indépendance des agences publiques » ne vise pas seulement l’institut des statistiques, elle concerne avant tout le secrétariat d’Etat chargé des recettes publiques. Cela signifie que le coeur de l’appareil économique de l’Etat échappe au contrôle des gouvernements élus et fonctionne en réalité sous la supervision directe des institutions de l’UE.
    Soyons clairs : tout d’abord ces reculs, pour la première fois reconnus par Alexis Tsipras, n’ont jamais été discutés publiquement à quelque niveau que ce soit, ni dans le parti, ni au parlement, ni même au sein du gouvernement au sens d’une délibération collective. Ils sont tout simplement imposés, après avoir été concoctés dans l’opacité la plus totale des « négociations » avec l’UE.
    Deuxièmement, dans ce texte, Alexis Tsipras ne reprend pas ce qu’il a déclaré ailleurs à plusieurs reprises, à savoir que la Grèce est depuis février soumise au chantage à la liquidité exercé par la BCE. Seul est mentionné l’arrêt du versement des prêts, ce qui a contraint le gouvernement grec à assumer le remboursement des créanciers avec ses seules ressources propres, ce qui a conduit à la situation actuelle des caisses vides. Ce faisant il se prive de l’argument majeur qui lui aurait permis de dévoiler vraiment les agissements de l’UE, mais l’aurait du même coup conduit à admettre l’affaiblissement de sa position et le caractère néfaste de l’accord du 20 février dont il continue de se réclamer.
    Troisièmement, il est clair que, quelle que soit la façon dont on pose la question, le cadre que propose Tsipras est celui d’une austérité atténuée, en aucun cas d’une rupture avec l’austérité. L’édifice des mémoranda est intégralement reconduit, juste adouci à la marge. A l’inverse, il ne reste pas grand chose du « programme de Thessalonique », qui était, ne l’oublions pas présenté comme un « programme d’urgence », applicable de façon immédiate et indépendamment de l’issue des négociations. Pire même : les quatre « lignes rouges » qu’Alexis Tsipras lui-même avait posée le 16 avril lors d’une déclaration solennelle à l’agence Reuters (sur les retraites, la TVA, les privatisations et les conventions collectives) ont TOUTES, à des degrés divers, été franchies.
    On peut dès lors se demander où se trouve le blocage et pourquoi Alexis Tsipras recherche-t-il la dramatisation, comme l’indiquent le titre de l’article et certains passages ? Tout simplement parce que les responsables européens ne se contentent pas de la gestion du cadre austéritaire/mémorandaire existant. Ils demandent une reconduction aggravée dans le but de briser Syriza. Et Tsipras leur renvoie la balle en leur disant : « c’est vous qui recherchez la rupture, pas moi. Moi, vous voyez, je suis prêt à gérer l’austérité et à reporter sine die le programme pour lequel j’ai été élu, mais en plus de cela vous me demander d’aller au-delà même de ce que vous aviez demandé à Samaras ». Et là il brandit le spectre de la « division de l’Europe » et en appelle au respect de ses « valeurs », comme si l’enterrement des engagements de Syriza cinq mois à peine après son élection était un sacrifice acceptable pour préserver cette « unité » de l’Europe ; comme si l’acceptation du « deal » qu’il propose pouvait représenter un pas vers « l’Europe de la solidarité, de l’égalité et de la démocratie » dont il se réclame, qui n’est qu’une phraséologie creuse et qui a rarement sonné de façon aussi sinistre.
    Je m’abstiendrai, pour ma part, de jouer au prophète et de prédire à quoi tout cela va nous conduire. Je constate simplementà l’état où sont actuellement les choses :
    1. que le gouvernement grec est entré dans une véritable spirale de reculs, où une concession mène à une autre, et il n’y a aucune raison de penser que cela va s’arrêter.
    2. Que tout cela était parfaitement prévisible dans la mesure où une ligne de confrontation n’avait pas été préparée et adoptée (je déteste me citer mais tout cela figure dans de très nombreux textes et interventions des derniers mois et même des dernières années, qui émanent de toute la gauche de Syriza ).
    3. Que bien évidemment persister après tout cela de parler d’une rupture avec l’austérité et les politiques néolibérales dans le cadre européen actuel ne peut que relever de l’inconscience ou de l’escroquerie.
    Une dernière chose, plus personnelle : je milite depuis 35 ans dans les rangs de la gauche radicale en Grèce et en France. J’ai notamment combattu sans relâche les reniements et les lâchetés de l’ère Mitterand, puis Jospin, avec ou sans participation du PCF (dont j’ai fait partie dans les années 1980) au gouvernement. J’ai également refusé toute concession au système PASOK et au bourbier nauséabond dans lequel il s’est enfoncé lui-même et a entraîné la société grecque.
    Il est fort peu probable que je change maintenant. Et je ne suis pas le seul dans Syriza à penser comme cela. Ceux qui pensent que tout cela passera comme une lettre à la poste se font des idées.
    Nous n’avons pas dit notre dernier mot.