• Industrialization in Africa: Ethiopia Wants to Become the New ‘Made in China’

    As China transitions its economy from manufacturing to services, and a lot of industrial production looks for a new home, 85 million jobs will be up for grabs. Ethiopia, for its part, is aggressively positioning itself as a destination for some of that Chinese manufacturing.


    #Chine #Afrique #industrialisation #Éthiopie

    “China is about to relocate 85 million jobs — Southeast Asia does not have enough population to absorb these”

    The enlightenment of Helen Hai |People |chinadaily.com.cn

    Besides, Europe and the US allow imports of some products from Africa free of taxes, including shoes, which adds to the profit.

    “This advantage in manufacturing has already shifted from the West to China,” Hai says. “The West doesn’t really have it anymore with this type of operation. What we are doing is combining Chinese know-how with competitive labor,” Hai says.


    http://seenthis.net/messages/498505 via Fil

  • Tensions in the South China Sea: a politico-strategic overview

    It’s been a decade since the evolutions in the South China Sea became more and more part of the politico-strategic global agenda. The rise of China challenges the almost complete American naval influence in Asia-Pacific, an area of high strategic importance for numerous actors, both regional and extra-regional. That said, it is worth to notice that China is systematically targeted by most of the western analysts, especially Americans, not only as the aggressor, but as the only aggressor in the region.


    #mer_de_Chine #Chine
    via @ville_en

    http://seenthis.net/messages/491786 via CDB_77

  • Coming soon : A “Made in India” space shuttle — Quartz

    A “Made in India” space shuttle may be on the horizon.
    This month, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO)—India’s equivalent of NASA—will begin the mission to launch its indigenous space shuttle, the Press Trust of India reported on May 15.
    Although the test model is about six times smaller than the actual version, the launch will be a significant milestone in ISRO’s Reusable Launch Vehicle-Technology Demonstration Program.

    #espace #inde

    et si les prouesses de L’Inde ne vous animent pas, voyez celles des #startups en #Chine :

    http://seenthis.net/messages/490260 via Fil

  • Difficile tournant économique de la Chine.
    President Xi’s stance on China’s economy laid bare as he distances hallmark policy from Western-style supply-side economics | South China Morning Post

    An explanation of President Xi Jinping’s hallmark economic policy, in his own words, was ­published in People’s Daily yesterday – one day after it printed an interview with an unidentified “authoritative” source repudiating China’s debt-fuelled growth policies.
    Xi’s explanation – a 20,000-character transcript of a speech that occupied two pages in the newspaper – was the most comprehensive elaboration of the president’s thinking on the Chinese economy’s past, present and future and its role in the global economy since he became the country’s leader more than three years ago.
    Xi made the speech in January to principal ministerial and provincial officials.
    “I need to be clear, the supply-side structural reform we are talking about is not the same as the supply-side economics school in the West,” Xi said.
    “[We] must prevent some people from using their interpretations [of supply-side reform] to promote ‘neo-liberalism’,” he continued, drawing a line ­between his policy and those of Ronald Reagan of the United States or Margaret Thatcher of Britain in the 1980s.
    China’s supply-side reform was more than “an issue of tax or tax rate” – it was a slew of structural measures to seek innovation, prosperity and well-being.
    Xi said some Chinese officials did not understand the point of supply-side reform.
    “I highlighted the issue of supply-side structural reform at last year’s central economic work conference, and it triggered heated debate, with fairly good endorsement from the international community and various sides at home,” Xi said.
    “But some comrades told me that they didn’t fully understand supply-side reform ... I need to talk about this issue again.”

    Xi said the concept could be implemented by “cutting capacity, reducing inventory, cutting ­leverage, lowering costs, and strengthening the weak links”.
    “Our supply-side reform, to say it in a complete way, is supply-side structural reform, and that’s my original wording used at the central economic work conference,” Xi said
    “The word ‘structural’ is very important, you can shorten it as ‘supply-side reform’, but please don’t forget the word ‘structural’,” Xi said.
    As China’s economy splinters along provincial lines, nuanced policy becomes key

    The key problem for the Chinese economy was “on the supply side”, though China could not ­afford to completely neglect managing demand.
    China could not rely on “stimulating domestic demand to address structural problems such as overcapacity”, he said.
    “The problem in China is not about insufficient demand or lack of demand, in fact, demands in China have changed, but supplies haven’t changed accordingly,” Xi said.
    He gave the example of Chinese consumers shopping overseas for daily products such as electric rice cookers, toilet covers, milk powder and even baby bottles to show that domestic supply did not match domestic demand.
    Xi’s emphasis on supply-side change was part of a global trend, said Li Yang, a former vice-president at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a government think tank.
    “The economic problems cannot be solved by demand-side policies. Macro economies around the world, including China’s, are changing toward supply-side policies, paying attention to the real economy, structural factors, and eyeing innovation as the major driver,” Li said yesterday.

    #Chine #Xi_Jinping

  • Le photographe de Magnum Patrick Zachmann clôt son travail sur l’empire du Milieu avec une série qui met côte à côte petits-enfants et grands-parents.


    Liu Hai, 27 ans, et son grand-père, Liu Wei An, 80 ans. Dans le Sichuan, en 2015. « Il y a une désertion des villages et l’enfant reste seul toute l’année. Cela engendre des problèmes psychologiques et affectifs. »
    Photo Patrick Zachmann. Magnum

    #photographie #chine

    http://seenthis.net/messages/486419 via grommeleur

  • #Japon : pourquoi la droite nationaliste voterait #Donald_Trump

    La droite nationaliste japonaise, qui domine le gouvernement conservateur de Tokyo, verrait d’un bon œil l’arrivée de Donald Trump à la Maison Blanche, en dépit de ses tirades anti-nipponnes. Enjeu, la révision d’une Constitution pacifiste honnie, le #réarmement voire l’accès à l’arme #nucléaire. Entretien.

    #International #article_9 #Chine #Corée_du_Nord #défense #Hideaki_Kase #Nihon_Kaigi #Nobosuke_Kiishi #révision_constitutionnelle #Rokasho #Russie #Shinzo_Abe

  • Echapper à l’emprise de Pékin - Taïwan en quête de souveraineté économique, par Tanguy Lepesant (mai 2016)

    Elue triomphalement, Mme Tsai Ing-wen, issue du Parti démocrate progressiste (indépendantiste), prend ses fonctions de présidente de la République de #Chine (#Taïwan) à la fin du mois. Inutile de dire que Pékin voit son arrivée sans enthousiasme, si ce n’est avec une certaine hostilité. La nouvelle présidente devra également faire face aux aspirations sociales des Taïwanais.

  • Un ancien bastion anticommuniste s’ouvre à la #Chine - L’Amérique centrale lâche Taipei, par Guillaume Beaulande @quetzal (mai 2016)

    Longtemps les gouvernements anticommunistes d’Amérique centrale ont offert à #Taïwan certains de ses plus fidèles alliés. L’évolution politique de la Chine et le renforcement de ses liens commerciaux avec la région ont toutefois modifié la donne… Les deux rivaux du détroit de Formose ne luttent pas à armes égales et, pour Taipei, l’isolement diplomatique menace.

    • Oui.
      Mais Taïwan n’est plus dans la situation critique qu’elle avait il y a quelques années.
      Les relations avec le gouvernement chinois se sont détendues.
      L’introduction de l’économie capitaliste et sa réussite spectaculaire, la place importante de la Chine dans le commerce mondial, font que l’opposition entre le géant communiste avec le petit Taïwan capitaliste se limite à une question de réunion de l’île au continent d’origine.
      D’après ce que j’ai lu, il n’est plus impossible que cette réunion se produise dans un futur plus ou moins proche, Taïwan disposant alors d’une autonomie.
      Par contre, l’exemple de « l’autonomie » de Hong Kong montre à quel point Taïwan devra prendre des précautions si cette réunion se produit un jour.

  • L’Amérique centrale lâche Taipei, par Guillaume Beaulande (Le Monde diplomatique, mai 2016)

    Longtemps les gouvernements anticommunistes d’Amérique centrale ont offert à Taïwan certains de ses plus fidèles alliés. L’évolution politique de la Chine et le renforcement de ses liens commerciaux avec la région ont toutefois modifié la donne… Les deux rivaux du détroit de Formose ne luttent pas à armes égales et, pour Taipei, l’isolement diplomatique menace.


  • Président-S, l’antimissile russe première option pour les avions militaires

    L’une des plus sophistiquées, arme défensive conçue par la Russie est actuellement négociée pour les pays ayant la menace terroriste au devant de leur sécurité. L’arme en question est appelée « President-S ». Elle est destinée à parer aux attaques de missiles sol-air. C’est un système, est créé par Développeur et fabricant : Scientific-Institut de recherche Ekran. Il est de haute technologie, capable d’altérer la trajectoire de projectiles visant les appareils volants et d’autres cibles stationnaires. (...)

    international, suivi, grand événement, internationaux, monde, continent, Etats, conflits, paix,

    / #Syrie,_opposition,_Turquie,_Qatar,_armée,_Alep,_Damas,_Bashar_Al-Assad,_Liban, censure, presse, journaux, dictature, expressions, liberté, #diplomatie,_sécurité,_commerce,_économie_mondiale, fait (...)

    #international,suivi,_grand_événement,_internationaux,_monde,_continent,_Etats,_conflits,_paix, #censure,_presse,_journaux,_dictature,_expressions,_liberté #fait_divers,_société,_fléau,_délinquance,_religion,_perdition #Chine,_réforme,_développement,_environnement,_Asie, #Egypte,Morsi,_Frères_musulmans,_islamistes,_Printemps_Arabe #Russie,_Poutine,_Europe_de_l’Est,

  • The limits to Chinese political power | East Asia Forum

    The limits to Chinese political power
    25 April 2016
    Author: Editors, East Asia Forum

    As China has become a larger player in the world economy and its influence in world political affairs has grown, the need to understand the Chinese political system and how political power is exercised within it has grown commensurately. Policymakers and markets around the world are now affected everyday by the decisions of Chinese political leaders in some way or other.

    Many in the rest of the world are now in routine contact with their business partners, professional colleagues, family and friends in China on a scale unprecedented in human history. It is inevitable that they are increasingly sensitive to how the Chinese people view their political leaders and the process whereby they govern this massive polity. In these days of interconnected technologies, not even state security in China can long deny these exchanges if China continues to want the prosperity that derives from openness to the world economy.

    China matters economically and politically and the way in which it is run matters more and more to the success of the stated aspirations of its people through its leadership and its extensive dealings within the international community. No wonder then that the importance of informed and careful analysis of developments in the Chinese political system is at a premium around the world today.

    There are analysts, of course, and there are analysts, and not all deserve equal weight or attention. There are those who have made long professions of predicting political implosion and collapse in China, as the political system, through economic reform, has opened China to the rest of the world, and that industry has naturally expanded as China faces the challenges of the next phase of its economic reform and the response to its political presence externally.

    In this week’s lead, when Carl Minzner an eminent scholar of Chinese governance suggests that ‘China is clearly moving to a darker era’, we need to listen and ask why.

    Minzner characterises this ‘darker era’ in two ways: a crackdown on lawyers, journalists and civil society activists; and a ‘steady breakdown of the authoritarian political rules of the game that have held sway since the beginning of the modern era’.

    It is the second of these that worries him most. He thinks that Xi Jinping is trying to personalise institutional reforms, and argues that this personalisation of institutional power will lead to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s ‘cannabalis[ing] itself’. Nathan Attrill has similar concerns, noting that Xi’s personalised leadership is attended by great risks.

    What does this mean?

    According to Minzner, the mechanisms by which the central state exerts power are steadily sliding towards de-institutionalised channels. These channels include: ‘cultivation of a budding cult of personality around Xi and a steady ideological pivot away from the Communist Party’s revolutionary socialist origins in favour of the “China Dream”, a revival of an ethno-nationalist ideology rooted in imperial history, tradition and Confucianism, and a revival of Maoist-era tactics of “rule by fear” including televised confessions and unannounced disappearances of state officials and civil society activists alike. Fear, tradition and personal charisma do not amount to institutional governance…The Party-state’s reform-era efforts to build more institutionalised systems of governance are being steadily eroded’.

    Xi Jinping is undoubtedly a stronger and more high-profile leader than his predecessor Hu Jintao. He came to the leadership with the Party in some disarray over major scandals such as the Bo Xilai affair and facing a tide of concern about flagrant corruption across all levels of government. Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has been more thorough and far-reaching than the one Hu launched when he came to power. Xi has broken previous norms — specifically, don’t target Politburo Standing Committee members and don’t snatch people from overseas (or if you do, definitely don’t smirk about it). The committees that coordinate China’s diverse interests and make policy are now often reporting directly to Xi rather than to the nominal head of that policy area.

    Minzner’s case is plausible. Xi’s centralisation of power may have advantages in dealing with big issues but it also increases the risks of failure — and the risk of Xi’s being held personally responsible if things go wrong.

    Minzner’s claim that the CCP is ‘cannibalising itself’ is more provocative.

    For starters, while leadership is essential to any state — more so in what is analytically unhelpfully characterised as an authoritarian state — there are limits to what Xi himself can do.

    The centres of power and influence and the constraints on central power in China are real. Personalisation of institutional reform has its boundaries. Xi is General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, the head of the world’s largest political organisation and, while constitutional constraints may be weak, the selectorate wields structured power on many levels. While Xi can disturb and change the incentives of Party members through his anti-corruption drive, his control over cadre behaviour has its limits.

    In consolidating a number of policy areas underneath him (including national security), Xi has undoubtedly increased the coherence in Chinese policymaking. He also invites himself to be held directly accountable should there be policy failure. At the popular level, this accountability is assuredly weak; there are no inclusive democratic elections. But within the Party, there is a more robust, if also still weak, system of accountability. And as we move into the first phase of leadership succession in 2017, it will matter, as it would matter in a democracy, how people beyond the Party think about how successfully the leadership has been traveling. Policy developments must be framed and assessed in the context of a more pluralist political system than is instinctively assumed of a one-party state.

    Minzner speaks powerfully for many in both China and the West who see this as a ‘dark period’ of Chinese governance, where hoped-for progress towards a more representative system of government is very difficult at present to discern. But there are many shades in darkness that shroud easy judgment about the evolution of the Chinese political system.

    China must be dealt with as it is — case by case, rule by rule, situation by situation. Seeing China clearly as it is, beyond whatever hopes and dreams we may have for its future, requires understanding and accepting the limits on anyone’s power to change it inside or outside the system, and working with the China we have, not the China that even President Xi encourages to dream of 50 or a 100 years hence.

    The EAF Editorial Group is comprised of Peter Drysdale, Shiro Armstrong, Ben Ascione, Ryan Manuel and Jillian Mowbray-Tsutsumi and is located in the Crawford School of Public Policy in the ANU College of Asia and the Pacific.

  • Pollution en Chine... Where in China can you find the worst air pollution? You might be surprised ... | South China Morning Post

    Xinjiang and Henan were China’s top two polluted provinces in the first quarter of the year, a survey by Greenpeace has found.
    Experts say the finding may reflect a trend in polluting factories moving west to avoid more stringent green policies being introduced in the east. It may also reflect a greater use of heating during last year’s harsh winter.
    Both were more polluted than Hebei province, which is known for its steel factories and has topped the list in the past.
    The average level of PM2.5 – the tiny particulates that can lodge deep in people’s lungs – in Xinjiang and Henan surpassed 100 micrograms per cubic metre. That is 10 times the safe level recommended by the World Health Organisation (WHO).
    Watershed crisis: China’s cities tap into sea of polluted water

    Six of China’s 10 most polluted cities were in Xinjiang, while Henan and Shandong accounted for the rest, according to the air quality ranking of 362 cities.
    In the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei area, once the worst polluted region, PM2.5 levels dropped 23 per cent compared to the same period last year. The improvement comes on the back of a slowdown in the coal and steel sectors.
    The results show the measures to curb air pollution in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze and Pearl River Deltas are workingDONG LIANSAI, GREENPEACE EAST ASIA

    #Chine,#Pollution, #Xinjiang

  • Tuhao goes shopping for jewelry with 8 robotic maids: Shanghaiist

    In case people around him were having any doubts about his incredible wealth, one #tuhao went shopping at a Guangzhou mall last week escorted by eight #robot servants.


    Some wondered if Wang Sicong, tuhao supreme, son of China’s richest man, could even pull this kind of thing off. Probably not, he’s too busy running up tabs at clubs and buying his dog Apple watches.


    #chine #richissimes #étalage_de_luxe #apple_watch_pour_les_chiens

    Tuhao (土豪) is a Chinese term referring to people of wealth.

    http://seenthis.net/messages/482395 via Fil

  • Un train venu de Chine est arrivé en France pour lancer une nouvelle « Route de la Soie »

    Parti le 6 avril dernier, ce convoi de la société chinoise WAE a roulé pendant 16 jours et sur 11 300 kilomètres de rails à travers la Chine, le Kazakhstan, la Russie, la Biélorussie, la Pologne, l’Allemagne et enfin la France. Cette liaison inédite s’inscrit dans un grand plan chinois de « Ceinture économique », qui vise à consolider la place de la Chine dans le commerce mondial.


    Ce convoi devrait repartir dans les prochains jours, chargé de vin et d’autres produits agricoles français. Les autorités françaises ont annoncé la mise en place prochaine de trois liaisons hebdomadaires entre Wuhan et Lyon.


    Si ce trajet Chine-France constitue une première historique, des trains circulent déjà depuis 2014 entre le Sichuan (ouest de la Chine) et la ville allemande de Duisbourg. Sur son site Internet, une autre compagnie de fret chinoise, Trans Eurasia Logistics (TEL), indique que des liaisons régulières existent par ailleurs entre 16 villes chinoises et autant de villes européennes, comme Barcelone, Bologne, Rotterdam ou encore Kotka en Finlande.


    À l’heure où les prix du pétrole sont si bas que cela coûte moins cher pour un cargo de faire le tour de l’Afrique plutôt que de passer par le canal de Suez en Égypte, le gouvernement chinois entend défendre « l’esprit » de la Route de la Soie face à des « situations internationales et régionales complexes ». Cette grande stratégie comporte un volet terrestre avec trois axes — vers la Russie, vers l’Asie de l’Ouest et vers la péninsule indochinoise —, mais aussi toute une partie maritime en coopération avec des ports birmans, indiens et pakistanais. Ce plan prévoit également des mesures politiques, numériques et culturelles, dans le but de créer un vaste espace de coopération « marqué par l’harmonie et l’amitié ».

    Pour comprendre il manque quand même quelques éléments de comparaison avec le transport maritime. J’ai fait quelques recherches :
    – Temps de trajet en porte-conteneurs via le canal de Suez : 50 jours, le cap de Bonne-Espérance : 55/60 jours et maintenant même via l’Arctique : 35 jours.
    – la quantité de marchandises acheminée : 41 conteneurs contre plusieurs milliers en porte-conteneurs
    – le coût économique : "La voie maritime est moins chère, mais le ferroviaire représente un intermédiaire entre le navire et l’avion"
    – le coût écologique

    #Chemin_de_fer #Chine #France #Fret #Mondialisation_économique #Route_de_la_soie #Soft_Power #Transport_de_marchandises #Wuhan_Asia-Europe_Logistics #Économie

    http://seenthis.net/messages/482124 via Hoʍlett

  • #Djibouti, les Chinois arrivent !

    L’annonce de l’ouverture sur le territoire de la petite République de Djibouti de la première base militaire permanente de la #Chine à l’étranger et l’arrivée sur place, en février 2016, des premiers détachements de son #Armée marquent bien l’intention de Pékin de garantir, par les armes s’il le fallait, la sauvegarde de ses intérêts dans la région. Ces derniers mois, les tensions entre Pékin et Washington en mer de Chine du Sud connaissent un regain de vigueur. Pourtant, plus discrètement sans doute, la Chine (...)


    / #Relations_internationales, #Géopolitique, Chine, #Pays_du_Golfe, Armée, #États-Unis, Djibouti, (...)


  • Panama-Papers et journalisme d’investigation : un scoop adjugé à l’intégrité !

    Il faut rester critique à propos du scandale des « Panama-Papers », cependant ce scepticisme ne concède guère place à la moindre réfutation. Sauf la réaction de Vladimir Poutine ou bien celle de l’Algérie, où les noms des chefs d’Etats ne figurent pas directement sur un quelconque listing alors que de larges pans de leur entourage et membres de leurs familles y sont cités, très peu de récusations crédibles nient publiquement ces vérités. Exquis, le scoop, ou bien le « buzz », du Panama ! Wikileaks a (...)

    Actualité, événement, opinion, intérêt général, information, scoop, primauté

    / censure, presse, journaux, dictature, expressions, liberté, journaliste, poète, poésie, livre, écrits, #diplomatie,_sécurité,_commerce,_économie_mondiale, #crise,_capitalisme,_économie,_justice,_Bourse, économie, politique, (...)

    #Actualité,événement,_opinion,_intérêt_général,_information,_scoop,_primauté #censure,_presse,_journaux,_dictature,_expressions,_liberté #_journaliste,_poète,_poésie,_livre,_écrits #économie,_politique,_arts,_corruption,_opposition,_démocratie #fait_divers,_société,_fléau,_délinquance,_religion,_perdition #Chine,_réforme,_développement,_environnement,_Asie,

  • Reporterre sur France Inter : la #Chine n’est pas le grand méchant du climat

    Lundi 28 mars 2016 Une équipe franco-chinoise vient de démontrer que la responsabilité de la Chine dans le changement climatique n’est pas aussi importante qu’initialement estimée. Pourquoi ? Parce que si ce pays demeure le principal émetteur de CO2, pour environ 25 % du total mondial, le gaz carbonique n’est pas le seul facteur du changement climatique. Les chercheurs ont aussi pris en compte les aérosols (petites particules qui influent sur le rayonnement solaire reçu ou renvoyé par la planète) et (...)


    / Climat , Chine

    « http://www.franceinter.fr/depeche-pourquoi-certains-poissons-sont-de-plus-en-plus-petits »
    « http://www2.centre-cired.fr/Equipe/Chercheurs/GASSER-Thomas/article/GASSER-Thomas »
    « http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v531/n7594/full/nature17165.html »
    « http://www.insu.cnrs.fr/node/5735 »
    « https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debate_over_China's_economic_responsibilities_for_climate_change_mitig »
    « http://www.franceinter.fr/emission-la-tete-au-carre »
    « http://www.radiofrance.fr/boite-a-outils/frequences »

  • Xi Jinping’s visit to Czech Republic raises hopes for European grand canal project | South China Morning Post

    President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the Czech Republic next week is raising hopes Chinese involvement can help realise a European grand canal project.
    On his first tour to a central and eastern European country, Xi hopes to elevate the China-Czech Republic relationship into a strategic partnership, and bring about 20 agreements, covering the fields of trade, infrastructure, finance, health, aviation, technology and culture.
    This will be the first time a Chinese head of state has visited the Czech Republic in an official capacity, and the fifth meeting between Xi and his Czech counterpart Milos Zeman since 2013.
    Zeman was the only leader from an EU member state to attend Beijing’s grand military parade in September to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of the second world war – a sign that, unlike his post-communist era predecessors, Zeman was moving closer to China.
    “Their discussion will likely focus on the One Belt, One Road plans,” said Feng Zhongping, head of European studies at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.

    #Chine , #Republique_tchèque, #Route_de_la_soie

  • China’s Rural Youngsters Drop Out of School at Alarming Rate, Researchers Find

    (Beijing) – Like many other teenagers in his village in the mountains of the northwestern province of Shaanxi, Chen Youliang decided to quit school early so he could follow in the footsteps of his migrant worker parents and find a job in a big city.
    Chen, who left school at 17 and is now 20, works as a cook in a small restaurant in Xi’an, the provincial capital. He says he wants to learn a skill so he can have a different career, but acknowledges that will be difficult. “Very few who leave (school) for a job can resume their studies,” he said.
    Chen is among the millions of students in rural areas who quit school each year without completing high school. Although there are no official statistics, studies by various research institutions say one in three students in villages – some 3 million teenagers on average – quit school every year before earning a high school diploma.
    Boys and girls in rural areas start leaving school at a much younger age than their peers in more developed regions. From 2007 to 2013, almost half the students in poor areas in the central and western parts of the country had left school by grade nine, a study published in December by the Rural Education Action Project (REAP), which involves the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Stanford University and several Chinese universities, found. The researchers, who studied 50,000 students, found something even more alarming: by grade 12, nearly two-thirds dropped out.
    The 2010 census showed that 78 percent of the country’s school-aged students lived in the countryside, and the research report said that “if dropout rates continue as they are today, increasing unemployment and widening inequality could hinder economic growth and stability on a national scale.”
    Surprisingly, poverty is not the major reason students leave school, said Yi Hongmei, a rural policy researcher at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, who pointed out that only 8 percent of students said they left school for financial reasons.
    Schools were not necessarily short of funding either, Yi said, because village schools get subsidies from the government to fund their operations. In 2007, the government eliminated tuition fees for students and started providing free textbooks for the first nine years of education. Students from poor families also get a small living allowance.
    Yet youngsters in rural areas keep quitting school. A government survey in 2013 said that that dropout rates in the seventh to ninth years of school in some regions climbed to 10 percent, up from a national average of 3 percent in 2000.
    Nearly half of the dropouts REAP surveyed said they quit to find work so they could “broaden their horizons and enjoy new experiences.” Another 30 per cent said they chose to leave because “everyone else is doing it.”
    Chen said that like many of his classmates he was bored in the classroom and did not see how his studies were helping his future.
    “Some dropouts are pushed hard by teachers but they can’t pass exams,” said Hu Yongqiang, who left a school in rural Shaanxi when he was in grade nine. “So they run away.”
    Rising wages for low-level jobs have made the lure of city life irresistible to many young villagers. In 2015, the annual income of a rural resident of the poorest parts of Shaanxi was 7,600 yuan, official data show. Meanwhile, a migrant worker can earn around 36,000 a year.
    That seems to be enough to convince a large number of young people from China’s countryside to head to the big city. The country had more than 40 million young migrant workers aged between 16 and 19 in 2014, one expert said.
    Middle School Woes
    Experts say rural junior middle schools – which cover the seventh to ninth years of school – are one of the biggest problems in the country’s education system. Stark inequalities in the distribution of resources have led to this failure, said Wei Jiayu from the New Citizen Program, a non-profit group focusing on rural education.
    The government spent an average of 900 yuan more each year on a student in an urban middle school than on a rural student, government data from 2013 show. A few rural junior middle schools with better teachers and facilities, like science labs and libraries, have higher university admission rates, but many others “are just a waste of time,” Wei said.
    A lack of qualified teachers in rural schools is one of the main turnoffs for students, an education official in the Qinba Mountains area of Shaanxi said. The REAP study found that teachers’ qualifications were linked to their students’ dropout rate. In schools where less than 30 percent of the teachers had a university degree, students dropped out at twice the rate compared to schools with more qualified staff.
    Most dropouts are students labeled by teachers as poor performers, said Liu Chengbin, a professor of sociology at Huazhong University of Science and Technology in the central city of Wuhan. Many teachers tend to pay more attention to students with strong academic records the others, said Liu, because the amount of funding a school receives from the government is linked to exam scores.
    “(Students’ scores) are related to teachers’ performance assessments and salaries as well,” said a teacher from the Qinba Mountains area.
    Some teachers even tried to persuade students who did poorly on tests to quit so average test scores would stay high, said Shi Yaojiang, a professor of education at Shaanxi Normal University in Xi’an.
    And the problems continue into high school. Beijing spent more than 28,000 yuan per high school student in 2013, compared to nearly 6,900 yuan per student in the southwestern province of Guizhou and nearly 5,500 yuan in the poor central province of Henan, research by the education information portal eol.cn in 2015 found.
    Left Out
    Tens of millions of rural workers have moved to urban areas in recent decades, but the country’s system of household registration, or hukou, makes it difficult for them to send their children to good schools in cities.
    Migrants often have no choice but to leave their children in rural areas to be educated. A lack of parental supervision compounds many students’ difficulties in rural schools, experts said.
    Some 60 million children are left in China’s villages to be raised by grandparents or relatives, official data show, and educators say this is contributing to problems keeping children in school. “(The high number of) dropouts is the result of long-term problems,” said a high school teacher in the Qinba Mountains.
    The REAP study also found that nearly three-quarters of rural children showed some signs of psychological trouble. The figure was just under 6 percent for students in cities.
    Over 13 percent of children left in villages by parents quit school by their eighth year of school, researchers found, but only 8.6 percent of those who were raised by their parents in rural villages chose to drop out.
    Researchers are concerned about the career prospects of those who have not completed their schooling. Scott Rozelle, a Stanford University professor who co-directed the study, said that as the country looks to shift from low-end manufacturing to services and value-added industries, the growing number of less-educated workers will be a burden on the economy.
    (Rewritten by Han Wei)

    #Chine #migrants #Enfants

  • Smog-Fighters Target Rural China’s Coal Stoves

    (Beijing) – Chinese leaders looking for a new way to breathe easier plan to prohibit the use of high-sulfur coal for home heating among farmers and poor families in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Province region.
    Local officials in these neighboring jurisdictions, which together form a chronically smoggy region about the size of the U.S. state of Minnesota, plan to bar small-scale use of high-sulfur coal by December 31, 2017, according to local officials. The prohibition is likely to affect some 600,000 households in the capital alone.
    Beijing plans to eliminate all coal burning in most of the city by 2017, and help affected households install electric heaters or other forms of low- or no-emissions heating by 2020. Meanwhile, the Hebei government said it wants 90 percent of the province’s household heating to rely on high-quality, low-emissions coal by 2017. Tianjin has also mapped out plans gradually phase out low-quality coal.
    Officials have been working on restrictions in step with orders from Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli. Speaking at a central government meeting January 4, Zhang told local governments nationwide to cut wintertime emissions from heaters and stoves that burn coal with high sulfur content.
    Zhang’s directive laid the groundwork for goals set in a “government work report” delivered by Premier Li Keqiang to the National People’s Congress in March. Li said the country plans to guarantee “good or excellent” air quality “for 80 percent of the year” in 335 cities across the country within five years.
    Beijing’s air quality was rated “good” for only half of 2015, according to the capital’s environmental protection bureau. And the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region was especially smoggy through the winter of 2015-16 – a phenomenon that some environmental experts blamed on coal heaters in older “ping fang,” or one-story, homes common in the region’s rural villages and poor urban neighborhoods.
    A recent analysis of Beijing’s air pollution by Peng Yingdeng, a researcher at the Urban Environmental Pollution Control Technology Research Center, a government-affiliated agency in Beijing, found that emissions from the burning of cheap, low-quality coal contributed to 15 percent of the tiny PM2.5 particulate matter choking the city, as well as 10 percent of the nitrogen oxide and 33 percent of the sulfur dioxide in the air.
    Peng’s study also pointed fingers at emissions from cars, industries and power plants – well-known sources of air pollution that the government has been working to better control for years with limited success.
    Homes and small businesses that burn coal in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei contribute up to half of the air pollution in the region every winter, said Zhao Yingmin, chief engineer at the Ministry of Environmental Protection. Output from these millions of coal stoves and heaters combine to reach those peaks while consuming about 10 percent, or some 36 million tons, of all coal burned in the region annually, he said. Beijing’s consumption alone accounts for some 4 million tons.
    Zhao’s conclusions are supported by a study by the Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences, a government think tank, released in August that focused on the Hebei city of Baoding, southwest of Beijing. The study said the amount of airborne ash and sulfur dioxide emitted by the coal burners that heat households exceeded similar emissions from the area’s industries during the winter of 2013.

    #Chine, #pollution #migrants

  • Quand la Chine s’inquiète de la présence US près de ses côtes, c’est de la mauvaise foi; quand c’est le contraire, c’est légitime
    U.S. Casts Wary Eye on Australian Port Leased by Chinese - The New York Times

    DARWIN, Australia — The port in this remote northern Australian outpost is little more than a graying old wharf jutting into crocodile-infested waters. On a recent day, there was stifling heat but not a ship in sight. “Our pissy little port,” as John Robinson, a flamboyant local tycoon, calls it.The financially hurting government of the Northern Territory was happy to lease it to a Chinese company in October for the bargain price of $361 million, raising money for local infrastructure projects.

    “We are the last frontier; you take what you can get,” said Mr. Robinson, who is known as Foxy. “The Northern Territory doesn’t have the money for development. Australia doesn’t have it. We need the major players like China.”

    But the decision has catapulted the port of Darwin into a geopolitical tussle pulling in the United States, China and Australia.

    This month, the United States said it was concerned that China’s “port access could facilitate intelligence collection on U.S. and Australian military forces stationed nearby.”
    #Chine #Etats-unis #Australie

  • La #Chine et les #terres_rares : l’histoire d’une victoire

    S’il est vrai qu’à l’heure actuelle la République populaire de Chine domine incontestablement la production mondiale de terres rares (elle détient plus de 90% de la production totale), la Chine n’a pas pour autant toujours été le maître du marché mondial des terres rares. Tout au long du XIXe siècle, la France est un leader scientifique dans le domaine des terres rares. Puis, en 1919, le chimiste Georges Urbain fonde la Société des produits chimiques des terres rares qui dispose d’une usine consacrée à la fabrication de briquet au mischmétal et de manchons à gaz à base de terres rares. L’usine, transférée à La Rochelle dans les années 1940, existe toujours et appartient à Rhodia (groupe Solvay). Son activité devrait cesser fin 2016 après presque 100 ans d’existence, faute de rentabilité.

    via @franz42
    cc @odilon

    http://seenthis.net/messages/471853 via CDB_77