• EU data watchdog to ‘convince’ Commission to ban automated recognition tech

    Automated recognition technologies in public spaces should be temporarily banned, the EU’s institutional data protection watchdog has said, arguing in favour of a moratorium. Applications that should be outlawed for a limited period of time not only include facial recognition technologies but also software that captures “gait, fingerprints, DNA, voice, keystrokes and other biometric or behavioral signals,” the European Data Protection Supervisor said on Tuesday (30 June). EDPS head Wojciech (...)

    #algorithme #CCTV #[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données_(RGPD)[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR)[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR) #biométrie #génétique #données #facial #reconnaissance #vidéo-surveillance #clavier #comportement #empreintes (...)

    ##[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données__RGPD_[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_ ##marche ##surveillance ##voix

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  • Data and Elections

    Democratic engagement is increasingly mediated by digital technology, from campaigning to election results transmission. These technologies rely on collecting, storing, and analysing personal information to operate. They raise novel issues and challenges for all electoral stakeholders on how to protect our data from exploitation. Elections are about more than voting and the entire election cycle is increasingly data dependent. Voter registration, voter authentication, voting and results (...)

    #vote #manipulation #données #élections #BigData #PrivacyInternational


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  • Facebook improperly gave users’ data to third-party developers, again

    Stop me if you’ve heard this one before : Facebook gave user data to third-party developers, even after specifically telling users it wouldn’t. In a Wednesday blog post, Facebook announced that (oops !) thousands of developers continued to receive updates to users’ non-public information well past the point when they should have. Specifically, Facebook said that, for an unspecified number of users, it failed to cut off the data spigot — like it promised it would back in 2018 — 90 days after a (...)

    #données #BigData #DataBrokers


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  • Doctissimo monétise les résultats de « tests de dépression » sans consentement : la CNIL saisie

    Une ONG britannique, Privacy International, vient de déposer une réclamation devant la CNIL au sujet du site de santé Doctissimo. Elle lui reproche de ne pas respecter le RGPD et de faire du business avec certaines données liées à la santé mentale. Migraine juridique à venir pour Doctissimo. Le célèbre site web communautaire dédié à la santé et au bien-être fait depuis peu l’objet d’une plainte devant la Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL). À la manœuvre, l’ONG britannique Privacy (...)

    #doctissimo.fr #[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données_(RGPD)[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR)[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR) #données #BigData #DataBrokers #marketing #publicité #santé #PrivacyInternational (...)

    ##[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données__RGPD_[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_ ##publicité ##santé ##CNIL

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  • Facial recognition on trial : emotion and gender “detection” under scrutiny in a court case in Brazil

    We are seeing AI-powered facial recognition systems deployed in increasingly sensitive environments around the world, and often without people’s knowledge or consent. It is critical to ensure these systems do not facilitate human rights violations, in particular of people and communities who are already at risk. When they are put in place on the basis of pseudoscientific claims that enable discriminatory inferences, it hurts human rights and destroys public trust. The Brazilian Institute of (...)

    #algorithme #CCTV #biométrie #technologisme #données #émotions #facial #reconnaissance #sexisme #vidéo-surveillance #LGBT #surveillance # (...)

    ##_ ##AccessNow

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  • Adtech giant Criteo is being investigated by France’s data watchdog

    Adtech giant Criteo is under investigation by the French data protection watchdog, the CNIL, following a complaint filed by privacy rights campaign group Privacy International. “I can confirm that the CNIL has opened up an investigation into Criteo . We are in the trial phase, so we can’t communicate at this stage,” a CNIL spokesperson told us. Privacy International has been campaigning for more than a year for European data protection agencies to investigate several adtech players and data (...)

    #RealTimeBidding-RTB #Criteo #[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données_(RGPD)[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR)[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR) #consentement #données #BigData #DataBrokers #marketing #publicité #santé #CNIL (...)

    ##[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données__RGPD_[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_ ##publicité ##santé ##PrivacyInternational ##DataProtectionCommissioner-DPC-Ireland ##ICO-UK

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  • Antitrust case against Facebook’s ‘super profiling’ back on track after German federal court ruling

    A landmark regulatory intervention that seeks to apply structural antitrust remedies to cut big (ad)tech’s rights-hostile surveillance business models down to size has been revived after Germany’s federal court overturned an earlier ruling that had suspended enforcement of a ban on Facebook combining user data into so called ‘super profiles’. The upshot is the tech giant could be forced to stop combining the personal data of users of its various social services with other personal data it (...)

    #Facebook #Instagram #WhatsApp #procès #domination #données #BigData #microtargeting #profiling #SocialNetwork #[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données_(RGPD)[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR)[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR) (...)

    ##[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données__RGPD_[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_ ##Bundeskartellamt

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  • Complaint against Doctissimo

    This legal challenge relates to a complaint filed with the French data protection authority (CNIL) against Doctissimo, a popular French health site. On 26 June 2020, Privacy International (PI) filed a complaint against the French health website Doctissimo with the French data protection authority (CNIL). Given that health websites can reveal such sensitive data about us, we would expect them to be 100% transparent about what happens to our data and give us a genuine choice as to whether (...)

    #doctissimo.fr #[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données_(RGPD)[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR)[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR) #consentement #données #BigData #santé #CNIL #PrivacyInternational #cookies #microtargeting (...)

    ##[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données__RGPD_[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_ ##santé ##publicité

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  • Valider son trajet à chaque voyage quand on est abonné : le juge de paix de Forest rappelle la STIB à l’ordre

    Kaddour Sellika n’est pas du genre à se laisser faire. Abonné à la Stib, il estime ne pas avoir à valider son abonnement à chaque trajet puisqu’il a payé à l’avance pour voyager sur le réseau de la Stib. Un jour, Kaddour Sellika subit un contrôle. Il présente son abonnement. Mais l’absence de validation est sanctionnée d’une amende de 10 euros. Il refuse de payer. Une question de principe Ce Bruxellois en fait une question de principe. La Stib n’a pas à connaître ses déplacements en recueillant ses (...)

    #STIB-MIVB # #[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données_(RGPD)[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR)[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR) #données (...)

    ##_ ##[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données__RGPD_[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_ ##Mobib

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  • Surveillance of minority Muslims in southern Thailand is powered by Chinese-style tech

    Mandatory biometric registration has left many Malay Muslims distrustful of the state and concerned about how new technologies will impact their lives When Arief’s cell phone service was cut off, it came as no surprise. He had refused to visit the local branch of his mobile provider and give his fingerprints and a facial scan, in order to register his SIM card. He did so as a matter of principle, to show his opposition to what many believe to be increasing intrusions into the lives of Malay (...)

    #algorithme #CCTV #SIM #biométrie #génétique #racisme #données #facial #FAI #reconnaissance #vidéo-surveillance #BigData #empreintes #Islam #profiling #surveillance #discrimination #HumanRightsWatch #Mengvii (...)


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  • Anonymous Stole and Leaked a Megatrove of Police Documents

    It’s been the better part of a decade since the hacktivist group Anonymous rampaged across the internet, stealing and leaking millions of secret files from dozens of US organizations. Now, amid the global protests following the killing of George Floyd, Anonymous is back—and it’s returned with a dump of hundreds of gigabytes of law enforcement files and internal communications. On Friday of last week, the Juneteenth holiday, a leak-focused activist group known as Distributed Denial of Secrets (...)

    #FBI #activisme #police #données #Anonymous #BigData #BlueLeaks #hacking


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  • Drones : Parrot tire à boulets rouges sur son rival chinois DJI

    La société française, qui lance un nouveau quadricoptère baptisé Anafi-USA, met en garde les pouvoirs publics sur les risques de fuites de données en cas d’attribution d’appels d’offres au groupe chinois.

    #Parrot #DJI #drone #géolocalisation #aérien #données #vidéo-surveillance #BigData #surveillance


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  • Les « BlueLeaks », immense fuite de documents montrant les rouages internes de dizaines d’agences de police des Etats-Unis

    Un collectif a mis en ligne 269 Go d’archives dans le but d’informer sur ce que la police « fait et a fait légalement ». Une fuite impressionnante de par son volume, et aux effets potentiellement lourds de conséquence aux Etats-Unis en raison de son contenu. C’est ainsi qu’on peut résumer les « BlueLeaks », un ensemble de données et de documents pesant près de 269 gigaoctets, publiés en libre accès alors qu’ils sont issus des rouages internes de dizaines d’agences de police réparties sur tout le (...)

    #police #données #hacking #surveillance #ACLU #BlueLeaks


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  • Blueleaks : Police Focused on Unfounded Threats Amid Protests

    Newly leaked documents reveal that, in the wake of George Floyd’s killing, local and federal law enforcement agencies repeatedly told police in Minnesota that they were under attack. The fears stoked by the warnings appear to have set the stage for the police’s escalating, violent response to the protests, including the widespread use of tear gas, percussion grenades, and rubber bullets, sometimes fired at close range. The documents show that law enforcement leadership warned of potential (...)

    #FBI #police #données #violence #BigData #surveillance #hacking


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  • Why we’re concerned about profiling and micro-targeting in elections.

    There is now an ecosystem that drives voter profiling and targeted messages, often known as micro-targeting, that accompany modern political campaigning globally. The targeted ad-supported internet is made up of thousands of companies that track and profile us all 24 hours a day- not just during election time. Key points While data driven political campaigns are not new, the granularity of data available and the potential power to sway or suppress voters through that data is. There is a (...)

    #CambridgeAnalytica/Emerdata #Facebook #Twitter #algorithme #[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données_(RGPD)[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR)[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation_(GDPR) #données #élections #prédiction #religion #BigData #comportement (...)

    ##CambridgeAnalytica/Emerdata ##[fr]Règlement_Général_sur_la_Protection_des_Données__RGPD_[en]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_[nl]General_Data_Protection_Regulation__GDPR_ ##marketing ##microtargeting ##profiling ##publicité ##PrivacyInternational

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  • The UK spent millions on a Covid-19 tracking app and then abandoned it

    Last month, Amber Beard tested out and wrote about a new Covid-19 tracking app that the UK government was trialing on the Isle of Wight. Beard explained how the app, named NHS Covid-19, was initially met with enthusiasm by residents and that a reported 65% downloaded it. However, NHS Covid-19 — which used Bluetooth technology to collect data from phones — raised concerns among privacy advocates and experts, who said it did not allow users enough control over how their data was shared and (...)

    #Apple #algorithme #iPhone #smartphone #iOS #contactTracing #technologisme #consentement #données #COVID-19 #santé (...)

    ##santé ##PrivacyInternational

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  • Démanteler les infrastructures de surveillance et de discrimination massives ?

    Si les annonces de moratoires dans le domaine de la reconnaissance faciale semblent soulager un certain nombre de ses opposants, il ne fait aucun doute que ces réponses des grandes entreprises de la technologie demeurent manifestement des décisions commerciales calculées et limitées qui répondent avec plus ou moins de sincérité à la pression publique du moment et aux très fortes mobilisations contre le racisme et les violences policières qui secouent les États-Unis depuis la mort de George Floyd le (...)

    #Clearview #Palantir #Ring #Facebook #Nextdoor #algorithme #CCTV #Rekognition #Amazon #biométrie #racisme #données #facial #prédiction #reconnaissance #vidéo-surveillance #BigData #BlackLivesMatter #discrimination #extrême-droite #GAFAM #surveillance (...)

    ##LaQuadratureduNet ##NAACP

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  • The business of building walls

    Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe is once again known for its border walls. This time Europe is divided not so much by ideology as by perceived fear of refugees and migrants, some of the world’s most vulnerable people.


    Who killed the dream of a more open Europe? What gave rise to this new era of walls? There are clearly many reasons – the increasing displacement of people by conflict, repression and impoverishment, the rise of security politics in the wake of 9/11, the economic and social insecurity felt across Europe after the 2008 financial crisis – to name a few. But one group has by far the most to gain from the rise of new walls – the businesses that build them. Their influence in shaping a world of walls needs much deeper examination.

    This report explores the business of building walls, which has both fuelled and benefited from a massive expansion of public spending on border security by the European Union (EU) and its member states. Some of the corporate beneficiaries are also global players, tapping into a global market for border security estimated to be worth approximately €17.5 billion in 2018, with annual growth of at least 8% expected in coming years.


    It is important to look both beyond and behind Europe’s walls and fencing, because the real barriers to contemporary migration are not so much the fencing, but the vast array of technology that underpins it, from the radar systems to the drones to the surveillance cameras to the biometric fingerprinting systems. Similarly, some of Europe’s most dangerous walls are not even physical or on land. The ships, aircrafts and drones used to patrol the Mediterranean have created a maritime wall and a graveyard for the thousands of migrants and refugees who have no legal passage to safety or to exercise their right to seek asylum.

    This renders meaningless the European Commission’s publicized statements that it does not fund walls and fences. Commission spokesperson Alexander Winterstein, for example, rejecting Hungary’s request to reimburse half the costs of the fences built on its borders with Croatia and Serbia, said: ‘We do support border management measures at external borders. These can be surveillance measures. They can be border control equipment...But fences, we do not finance’. In other words, the Commission is willing to pay for anything that fortifies a border as long as it is not seen to be building the walls themselves.

    This report is a sequel to Building Walls – Fear and securitization in the European Union, co-published in 2018 with Centre Delàs and Stop Wapenhandel, which first measured and identified the walls that criss-cross Europe. This new report focuses on the businesses that have profited from three different kinds of wall in Europe:

    The construction companies contracted to build the land walls built by EU member states and the Schengen Area together with the security and technology companies that provide the necessary accompanying technology, equipment and services;

    The shipping and arms companies that provide the ships, aircraft, helicopters, drones that underpin Europe’s maritime walls seeking to control migratory flows in the Mediterranean, including Frontex operations, Operation Sophia and Italian operation Mare Nostrum;
    And the IT and security companies contracted to develop, run, expand and maintain EU’s systems that monitor the movement of people – such as SIS II (Schengen Information System) and EES (Entry/Exit Scheme) – which underpin Europe’s virtual walls.

    Booming budgets

    The flow of money from taxpayers to wall-builders has been highly lucrative and constantly growing. The report finds that companies have reaped the profits from at least €900 million spent by EU countries on land walls and fences since the end of the Cold War. The partial data (in scope and years) means actual costs will be at least €1 billion. In addition, companies that provide technology and services that accompany walls have also benefited from some of the steady stream of funding from the EU – in particular the External Borders Fund (€1.7 billion, 2007-2013) and the Internal Security Fund – Borders Fund (€2.76 billion, 2014-2020).

    EU spending on maritime walls has totalled at least €676.4 million between 2006 to 2017 (including €534 million spent by Frontex, €28.4 million spent by the EU on Operation Sophia and €114 million spent by Italy on Operation Mare Nostrum) and would be much more if you include all the operations by Mediterranean country coastguards. Total spending on Europe’s virtual wall equalled at least €999.4m between 2000 and 2019. (All these estimates are partial ones because walls are funded by many different funding mechanisms and due to lack of data transparency).

    This boom in border budgets is set to grow. Under its budget for the next EU budget cycle (2021–2027) the European Commission has earmarked €8.02 billion to its Integrated Border Management Fund (2021-2027), €11.27bn to Frontex (of which €2.2 billion will be used for acquiring, maintaining and operating air, sea and land assets) and at least €1.9 billion total spending (2000-2027) on its identity databases and Eurosur (the European Border Surveillance System).
    The big arm industry players

    Three giant European military and security companies in particular play a critical role in Europe’s many types of borders. These are Thales, Leonardo and Airbus.

    Thales is a French arms and security company, with a significant presence in the Netherlands, that produces radar and sensor systems, used by many ships in border security. Thales systems, were used, for example, by Dutch and Portuguese ships deployed in Frontex operations. Thales also produces maritime surveillance systems for drones and is working on developing border surveillance infrastructure for Eurosur, researching how to track and control refugees before they reach Europe by using smartphone apps, as well as exploring the use of High Altitude Pseudo Satellites (HAPS) for border security, for the European Space Agency and Frontex. Thales currently provides the security system for the highly militarised port in Calais. Its acquisition in 2019 of Gemalto, a large (biometric) identity security company, makes it a significant player in the development and maintenance of EU’s virtual walls. It has participated in 27 EU research projects on border security.
    Italian arms company Leonardo (formerly Finmeccanica or Leonardo-Finmeccanica) is a leading supplier of helicopters for border security, used by Italy in the Mare Nostrum, Hera and Sophia operations. It has also been one of the main providers of UAVs (or drones) for Europe’s borders, awarded a €67.1 million contract in 2017 by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) to supply them for EU coast-guard agencies. Leonardo was also a member of a consortium, awarded €142.1 million in 2019 to implement and maintain EU’s virtual walls, namely its EES. It jointly owns Telespazio with Thales, involved in EU satellite observation projects (REACT and Copernicus) used for border surveillance. Leonardo has participated in 24 EU research projects on border security and control, including the development of Eurosur.
    Pan-European arms giant Airbus is a key supplier of helicopters used in patrolling maritime and some land borders, deployed by Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania and Spain, including in maritime Operations Sophia, Poseidon and Triton. Airbus and its subsidiaries have participated in at least 13 EU-funded border security research projects including OCEAN2020, PERSEUS and LOBOS.
    The significant role of these arms companies is not surprising. As Border Wars (2016), showed these companies through their membership of the lobby groups – European Organisation for Security (EOS) and the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) – have played a significant role in influencing the direction of EU border policy. Perversely, these firms are also among the top four biggest European arms dealers to the Middle East and North Africa, thus contributing to the conflicts that cause forced migration.

    Indra has been another significant corporate player in border control in Spain and the Mediterranean. It won a series of contracts to fortify Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish enclaves in northern Morocco). Indra also developed the SIVE border control system (with radar, sensors and vision systems), which is in place on most of Spain’s borders, as well as in Portugal and Romania. In July 2018 it won a €10 million contract to manage SIVE at several locations for two years. Indra is very active in lobbying the EU and is a major beneficiary of EU research funding, coordinating the PERSEUS project to further develop Eurosur and the Seahorse Network, a network between police forces in Mediterranean countries (both in Europe and Africa) to stop migration.

    Israeli arms firms are also notable winners of EU border contracts. In 2018, Frontex selected the Heron drone from Israel Aerospace Industries for pilot-testing surveillance flights in the Mediterranean. In 2015, Israeli firm Elbit sold six of its Hermes UAVs to the Switzerland’s Border Guard, in a controversial €230 million deal. It has since signed a UAV contract with the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), as a subcontractor for the Portuguese company CEIIA (2018), as well as contracts to supply technology for three patrol vessels for the Hellenic Coast Guard (2019).
    Land wall contractors

    Most of the walls and fences that have been rapidly erected across Europe have been built by national construction companies, but one European company has dominated the field: European Security Fencing, a Spanish producer of razor wire, in particular a coiled wire known as concertinas. It is most known for the razor wire on the fences around Ceuta and Melilla. It also delivered the razor wire for the fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia, and its concertinas were installed on the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey and Austria and Slovenia, as well as at Calais, and for a few days on the border between Hungary and Slovenia before being removed. Given its long-term market monopoly, its concertinas are very likely used at other borders in Europe.

    Other contractors providing both walls and associated technology include DAT-CON (Croatia, Cyprus, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia and Ukraine), Geo Alpinbau (Austria/Slovenia), Indra, Dragados, Ferrovial, Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén and Eulen (Spain/Morocco), Patstroy Bourgas, Infra Expert, Patengineeringstroy, Geostroy Engineering, Metallic-Ivan Mihaylov and Indra (Bulgaria/Turkey), Nordecon and Defendec (Estonia/Russia), DAK Acélszerkezeti Kft and SIA Ceļu būvniecības sabiedrība IGATE (Latvia/Russia), Gintrėja (Lithuania/Russia), Minis and Legi-SGS(Slovenia/Croatia), Groupe CW, Jackson’s Fencing, Sorhea, Vinci/Eurovia and Zaun Ltd (France/UK).

    In many cases, the actual costs of the walls and associated technologies exceed original estimates. There have also been many allegations and legal charges of corruption, in some cases because projects were given to corporate friends of government officials. In Slovenia, for example, accusations of corruption concerning the border wall contract have led to a continuing three-year legal battle for access to documents that has reached the Supreme Court. Despite this, the EU’s External Borders Fund has been a critical financial supporter of technological infrastructure and services in many of the member states’ border operations. In Macedonia, for example, the EU has provided €9 million for patrol vehicles, night-vision cameras, heartbeat detectors and technical support for border guards to help it manage its southern border.
    Maritime wall profiteers

    The data about which ships, helicopters and aircraft are used in Europe’s maritime operations is not transparent and therefore it is difficult to get a full picture. Our research shows, however, that the key corporations involved include the European arms giants Airbus and Leonardo, as well as large shipbuilding companies including Dutch Damen and Italian Fincantieri.

    Damen’s patrol vessels have been used for border operations by Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Portugal, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK as well as in key Frontex operations (Poseidon, Triton and Themis), Operation Sophia and in supporting NATO’s role in Operation Poseidon. Outside Europe, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey use Damen vessels for border security, often in cooperation with the EU or its member states. Turkey’s €20 million purchase of six Damen vessels for its coast guard in 2006, for example, was financed through the EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), intended for peace-building and conflict prevention.

    The sale of Damen vessels to Libya unveils the potential troubling human costs of this corporate trade. In 2012, Damen supplied four patrol vessels to the Libyan Coast Guard, sold as civil equipment in order to avoid a Dutch arms export license. Researchers have since found out, however, that the ships were not only sold with mounting points for weapons, but were then armed and used to stop refugee boats. Several incidents involving these ships have been reported, including one where some 20 or 30 refugees drowned. Damen has refused to comment, saying it had agreed with the Libyan government not to disclose information about the ships.

    In addition to Damen, many national shipbuilders play a significant role in maritime operations as they were invariably prioritised by the countries contributing to each Frontex or other Mediterranean operation. Hence, all the ships Italy contributed to Operation Sophia were built by Fincantieri, while all Spanish ships come from Navantia and its predecessors. Similarly, France purchases from DCN/DCNS, now Naval Group, and all German ships were built by several German shipyards (Flensburger Schiffbau-Gesellschaft, HDW, Lürssen Gruppe). Other companies in Frontex operations have included Greek company, Motomarine Shipyards, which produced the Panther 57 Fast Patrol Boats used by the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Shipyards and Israel Shipyards.

    Austrian company Schiebel is a significant player in maritime aerial surveillance through its supply of S-100 drones. In November 2018, EMSA selected the company for a €24 million maritime surveillance contract for a range of operations including border security. Since 2017, Schiebel has also won contracts from Croatia, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The company has a controversial record, with its drones sold to a number of countries experiencing armed conflict or governed by repressive regimes such as Libya, Myanmar, the UAE and Yemen.

    Finland and the Netherlands deployed Dornier aircraft to Operation Hermes and Operation Poseidon respectively, and to Operation Triton. Dornier is now part of the US subsidiary of the Israeli arms company Elbit Systems. CAE Aviation (Luxembourg), DEA Aviation (UK) and EASP Air (Netherlands) have all received contracts for aircraft surveillance work for Frontex. Airbus, French Dassault Aviation, Leonardo and US Lockheed Martin were the most important suppliers of aircraft used in Operation Sophia.

    The EU and its member states defend their maritime operations by publicising their role in rescuing refugees at sea, but this is not their primary goal, as Frontex director Fabrice Leggeri made clear in April 2015, saying that Frontex has no mandate for ‘proactive search-and-rescue action[s]’ and that saving lives should not be a priority. The thwarting and criminalisation of NGO rescue operations in the Mediterranean and the frequent reports of violence and illegal refoulement of refugees, also demonstrates why these maritime operations should be considered more like walls than humanitarian missions.
    Virtual walls

    The major EU contracts for the virtual walls have largely gone to two companies, sometimes as leaders of a consortium. Sopra Steria is the main contractor for the development and maintenance of the Visa Information System (VIS), Schengen Information System (SIS II) and European Dactyloscopy (Eurodac), while GMV has secured a string of contracts for Eurosur. The systems they build help control, monitor and surveil people’s movements across Europe and increasingly beyond.

    Sopra Steria is a French technology consultancy firm that has to date won EU contracts worth a total value of over €150 million. For some of these large contracts Sopra Steria joined consortiums with HP Belgium, Bull and 3M Belgium. Despite considerable business, Sopra Steria has faced considerable criticism for its poor record on delivering projects on time and on budget. Its launch of SIS II was constantly delayed, forcing the Commission to extend contracts and increase budgets. Similarly, Sopra Steria was involved in another consortium, the Trusted Borders consortium, contracted to deliver the UK e-Borders programme, which was eventually terminated in 2010 after constant delays and failure to deliver. Yet it continues to win contracts, in part because it has secured a near-monopoly of knowledge and access to EU officials. The central role that Sopra Steria plays in developing these EU biometric systems has also had a spin-off effect in securing other national contracts, including with Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Romania and Slovenia GMV, a Spanish technology company, has received a succession of large contracts for Eurosur, ever since its testing phase in 2010, worth at least €25 million. It also provides technology to the Spanish Guardia Civil, such as control centres for its Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE) border security system as well as software development services to Frontex. It has participated in at least ten EU-funded research projects on border security.

    Most of the large contracts for the virtual walls that did not go to consortia including Sopra Steria were awarded by eu-LISA (European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) to consortia comprising computer and technology companies including Accenture, Atos Belgium and Morpho (later renamed Idema).

    As research in our Border Wars series has consistently shown, through effective lobbying, the military and security industry has been very influential in shaping the discourse of EU security and military policies. The industry has succeeded in positioning itself as the experts on border security, pushing the underlying narrative that migration is first and foremost a security threat, to be combatted by security and military means. With this premise, it creates a continuous demand for the ever-expanding catalogue of equipment and services the industry supplies for border security and control.

    Many of the companies listed here, particularly the large arms companies, are involved in the European Organisation for Security (EOS), the most important lobby group on border security. Many of the IT security firms that build EU’s virtual walls are members of the European Biometrics Association (EAB). EOS has an ‘Integrated Border Security Working Group’ to ‘facilitate the development and uptake of better technology solutions for border security both at border checkpoints, and along maritime and land borders’. The working group is chaired by Giorgio Gulienetti of the Italian arms company Leonardo, with Isto Mattila (Laurea University of Applied Science) and Peter Smallridge of Gemalto, a digital security company recently acquired by Thales.

    Company lobbyists and representatives of these lobby organisations regularly meet with EU institutions, including the European Commission, are part of official advisory committees, publish influential proposals, organise meetings between industry, policy-makers and executives and also meet at the plethora of military and security fairs, conferences and seminars. Airbus, Leonardo and Thales together with EOS held 226 registered lobbying meetings with the European Commission between 2014 and 2019. In these meetings representatives of the industry position themselves as the experts on border security, presenting their goods and services as the solution for ‘security threats’ caused by immigration. In 2017, the same group of companies and EOS spent up to €2.65 million on lobbying.

    A similar close relationship can be seen on virtual walls, with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission arguing openly for public policy to foster the ‘emergence of a vibrant European biometrics industry’.
    A deadly trade and a choice

    The conclusion of this survey of the business of building walls is clear. A Europe full of walls has proved to be very good for the bottom line of a wide range of corporations including arms, security, IT, shipping and construction companies. The EU’s planned budgets for border security for the next decade show it is also a business that will continue to boom.

    This is also a deadly business. The heavy militarisation of Europe’s borders on land and at sea has led refugees and migrants to follow far more hazardous routes and has trapped others in desperate conditions in neighbouring countries like Libya. Many deaths are not recorded, but those that are tracked in the Mediterranean show that the proportion of those who drown trying to reach Europe continues to increase each year.

    This is not an inevitable state of affairs. It is both the result of policy decisions made by the EU and its member states, and corporate decisions to profit from these policies. In a rare principled stand, German razor wire manufacturer Mutanox in 2015 stated it would not sell its product to the Hungarian government arguing: ‘Razor wire is designed to prevent criminal acts, like a burglary. Fleeing children and adults are not criminals’. It is time for other European politicians and business leaders to recognise the same truth: that building walls against the world’s most vulnerable people violates human rights and is an immoral act that history will judge harshly. Thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time for Europe to bring down its new walls.


    #business #murs #barrières_frontalières #militarisation_des_frontières #visualisation #Europe #UE #EU #complexe_militaro-industriel #Airbus #Leonardo #Thales #Indra #Israel_Aerospace_Industries #Elbit #European_Security_Fencing #DAT-CON #Geo_Alpinbau #Dragados #Ferrovial, #Proyectos_Y_Tecnología_Sallén #Eulen #Patstroy_Bourgas #Infra_Expert #Patengineeringstroy #Geostroy_Engineering #Metallic-Ivan_Mihaylov #Nordecon #Defendec #DAK_Acélszerkezeti_Kft #SIA_Ceļu_būvniecības_sabiedrība_IGATE #Gintrėja #Minis #Legi-SGS #Groupe_CW #Jackson’s_Fencing #Sorhea #Vinci #Eurovia #Zaun_Ltd #Damen #Fincantieri #Frontex #Damen #Turquie #Instrument_contributing_to_Stability_and_Peace (#IcSP) #Libye #exernalisation #Operation_Sophia #Navantia #Naval_Group #Flensburger_Schiffbau-Gesellschaft #HDW #Lürssen_Gruppe #Motomarine_Shipyards #Panther_57 #Hellenic_Shipyards #Israel_Shipyards #Schiebel #Dornier #Operation_Hermes #CAE_Aviation #DEA_Aviation #EASP_Air #French_Dassault_Aviation #US_Lockheed_Martin #murs_virtuels #Sopra_Steria #Visa_Information_System (#VIS) #données #Schengen_Information_System (#SIS_II) #European_Dactyloscopy (#Eurodac) #GMV #Eurosur #HP_Belgium #Bull #3M_Belgium #Trusted_Borders_consortium #économie #biométrie #Integrated_System_of_External_Vigilance (#SIVE) #eu-LISA #Accenture #Atos_Belgium #Morpho #Idema #lobby #European_Organisation_for_Security (#EOS) #European_Biometrics_Association (#EAB) #Integrated_Border_Security_Working_Group #Giorgio_Gulienetti #Isto_Mattila #Peter_Smallridge #Gemalto #murs_terrestres #murs_maritimes #coût #chiffres #statistiques #Joint_Research_Centre_of_the_European_Commission #Mutanox

    Pour télécharger le #rapport :

    déjà signalé par @odilon ici :
    Je le remets ici avec des mots clé de plus

    ping @daphne @marty @isskein @karine4

    https://seenthis.net/messages/810272 via CDB_77

  • StopCovid, l’appli qui en savait trop - Page 1 | Mediapart

    Sur le papier, c’est très clair. Si vous avez téléchargé l’application StopCovid, que vous êtes atteint par le virus et que vous le déclarez dans l’appli, alors les données transmises au serveur central seront celles des personnes avec lesquelles vous avez été en contact « à moins d’un mètre pendant au moins 15 minutes », et qui disposent aussi de l’application. Les personnes seront alors prévenues qu’elles ont rencontré quelqu’un susceptible de leur avoir transmis le virus.

    Ce critère de distance et de durée, moins d’un mètre pendant plus d’un quart d’heure, est l’objet unique d’un arrêté du 30 mai 2020, qui lui-même précise le décret du 29 mai relatif à l’application. Le décret encadre le « traitement de données » effectué par l’application. En clair, il constitue l’assise légale de son fonctionnement.

    Gaëtan Leurent est chercheur en cryptographie à l’Inria, l’Institut national de recherche en informatique auquel le gouvernement a confié le pilotage du projet StopCovid. Il est aussi l’un des coauteurs du site risques-traçage.fr, qui a très tôt exposé un à un les dangers d’une application de contact tracing telle que StopCovid sous le titre « Le traçage anonyme, dangereux oxymore ». « Depuis, explique-t-il à Mediapart, on a suivi ce qui se passe avec le déploiement. »

    Deux points connexes l’ont intrigué particulièrement : comment la distance entre deux appareils est-elle calculée, et quelles sont les informations envoyées quand on se déclare malade. Il a donc mené des expériences. En plaçant deux téléphones à une distance de cinq mètres l’un de l’autre, séparés par un mur et pendant seulement quelques secondes, il s’est aperçu que ce « contact » entre les deux appareils, sans intérêt épidémiologique, était pourtant envoyé au serveur central s’il se déclarait porteur du virus.

    Et c’est bien là le hic. Interrogé par Mediapart, le secrétariat d’État au numérique confirme que « StopCovid repose sur la remontée de l’historique de proximité d’un utilisateur diagnostiqué positif : cet historique de proximité est constitué des contacts rencontrés par l’utilisateur positif ». Sous-entendu : tous les contacts, et non pas seulement les plus proches. « Le calcul de l’exposition au risque d’un des contacts de cet historique de proximité est effectué sur le serveur », poursuit le ministère. C’est le serveur qui va déterminer, entre tous les contacts de la personne positive, ceux qui auront été exposés suffisamment près et suffisamment longtemps.

    « Ce qui serait plus respectueux de la vie privée, c’est que le téléphone calcule » lui-même la distance qui le sépare d’un autre repéré par Bluetooth, puis envoie au serveur, le cas échéant, seulement ceux qui seront restés assez près, assez longtemps, estime Gaëtan Leurent. « Ce qui est dommage, c’est que si on envoie tous les contacts, c’est beaucoup plus d’infos que ce qui est utile. Il y a un risque sur la vie privée en cas de réidentification ou de recyclage des infos par malveillance. »

    Pour Baptiste Robert, hacker et chercheur en sécurité informatique qui a participé à la recherche de bugs dans l’application, l’envoi de tous les contacts permet « de voir des récurrences » : chaque jour, « on croise les mêmes personnes, on bosse avec les mêmes personnes ». Ainsi, des acteurs mal intentionnés pourraient « réidentifier la donnée assez rapidement ». Il regrette le choix qui a été fait, car selon lui, « l’appli pourrait trier ce qu’elle envoie ».

    Le stockage et le transfert des contacts brefs est justifié, selon le secrétariat au numérique, par le fait que tous les quarts d’heure, un nouvel identifiant est attribué à chaque appareil. Ainsi, un contact qui ne durerait que 5 minutes pourrait être la suite d’un contact de douze minutes : deux contacts que seul le serveur est capable de relier pour comprendre qu’il s’agit en réalité d’un seul, de 17 minutes, donc à risques.

    Pour remédier à cette difficulté, le chercheur en cryptographie Gaëtan Leurent pense « qu’il y aurait des moyens assez simples de limiter le problème ». Par exemple, « le téléphone pourrait filtrer les données pour ne garder les contacts courts que quand ils sont juste avant ou juste après un changement d’identifiant. Ça éliminerait déjà la majorité des contact courts ».

    #StopCovid #Données_personnelles #Anonymat

    https://seenthis.net/messages/861152 via Articles repérés par Hervé Le Crosnier

  • Les CSP opposés à la fouille des téléphones portables des requérant-e-s d’asile

    Un avant-projet de #révision de la #loi_sur_l’asile a été mis en consultation par la Commission des institutions politiques du Conseil national (https://www.parlament.ch/fr/organe/commissions/commissions-thematiques/commissions-cip/rapports-consultations-cip/consultation-cip-17-423). Il prévoit de laisser la possibilité au Secrétariat d’Etat aux Migrations de fouiller les téléphones portables et autres supports de #données_électroniques détenus par les personnes en demande d’asile, à des fins de procédure.

    Pour les Centres sociaux protestants, cette mesure porte trop durement atteinte au droit fondamental à la vie privée. Donner accès à ses #données_personnelles à une autorité doit par ailleurs faire l’objet d’un #consentement libre et éclairé, ce qui ne sera ici pas le cas, puisque les requérant-e-s d’asile sont contraint-e-s de collaborer avec l’autorité en question sous peine de voir leur demande d’asile être rejetée. Les CSP invitent le Parlement fédéral à rejeter cet avant-projet.

    #fouille #téléphones_portables #smartphone #Suisse #SEM #asile #migrations #réfugiés #procédure_d'asile

    La position détaillée du CSP :

    ping @isskein @karine4 @etraces

    https://seenthis.net/messages/860791 via CDB_77

  • Coronavirus : la troublante surmortalité des minorités ethniques au Royaume-Uni

    Le Covid-19 a bien davantage tué dans les zones les plus pauvres du pays et chez les « BAME » (« Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic »), populations fournissant de gros contingents de travailleurs essentiels, en première ligne pour maintenir l’activité, que dans les quartiers chics et blancs de la capitale. Le 7 mai, l’ONS publiait ainsi des données portant sur les morts en Angleterre et au Pays de Galles entre le 2 mars et le 10 avril. Il en ressortait que, pour une même classe d’âge et un même environnement socio-économique, les hommes et femmes noirs ont encore 1,9 fois plus de risques de mourir du Covid-19 que les Blancs. Le facteur de risque est de 1,8 pour les hommes d’origine bangladaise et pakistanaise, et de 1,6 pour les femmes de ces mêmes origines.
    Un constat corroboré par les résultats du projet Opensafely, se basant sur les données médicales de 17 millions de personnes résidant au Royaume-Uni (dont 5 683 sont décédées du Covid-19 dans des hôpitaux entre le 1er février et le 25 avril). Une fois écartés les facteurs de risque tels que l’âge, les maladies cardio-vasculaires, le diabète ou l’obésité, les personnes noires et d’origine asiatique ont encore 60 % à 70 % de risques de mourir en plus que les Blancs.


    https://seenthis.net/messages/856986 via CEPED_MIGRINTER_ICMigrations_santé

  • Like after #9/11, governments could use coronavirus to permanently roll back our civil liberties

    The ’emergency’ laws brought in after terrorism in 2001 reshaped the world — and there’s evidence that it could happen again.

    With over a million confirmed cases and a death toll quickly approaching 100,000, Covid-19 is the worst pandemic in modern history by many orders of magnitude. That governments were unprepared to deal with a global pandemic is at this point obvious. What is worse is that the establishment of effective testing and containment policies at the onset of the outbreak could have mitigated the spread of the virus. Because those in charge failed to bring in any of these strategies, we are now seeing a worrying trend: policies that trample on human rights and civil liberties with no clear benefit to our health or safety.

    Broad and undefined emergency powers are already being invoked — in both democracies and dictatorships. Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban was granted sweeping new powers to combat the pandemic that are unlimited in scope and effectively turn Hungary’s democracy into a dictatorship. China, Thailand, Egypt, Iran and other countries continue to arrest or expel anyone who criticizes those states’ response to coronavirus.

    The US Department of Justice is considering charging anyone who intentionally spreads the virus under federal terrorism laws for spreading a “biological agent”. Israel is tapping into previously undisclosed smartphone data, gathered for counterterrorism efforts, to combat the pandemic. States in Europe, anticipating that measures against Covid-19 will violate their obligations under pan-European human rights treaties, are filing official notices of derogation.

    A chilling example of the effects of emergency powers on privacy rights and civil liberties happened during the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the resulting “war on terror”, in which successive US presidents pushed the limits of executive power. As part of an effort to protect Americans from security threats abroad, US government officials justified the use of torture in interrogation, broad state surveillance tactics and unconstitutional military strikes, without the oversight of Congress. While the more controversial parts of those programs were eventually dismantled, some remain in place, with no clear end date or target.

    Those measures — passed under the guise of emergency — reshaped the world, with lasting impacts on how we communicate and the privacy we expect, as well as curbs on the freedoms of certain groups of people. The post-September 11 response has had far-reaching consequences for our politics by emboldening a cohort of populist leaders across the globe, who ride to election victories by playing to nationalist and xenophobic sentiments and warning their populations of the perils brought by outsiders. Covid-19 provides yet another emergency situation in which a climate of fear can lead to suspension of freedoms with little scrutiny — but this time we should heed the lessons of the past.

    First, any restriction on rights should have a clear sunset clause, providing that the restriction is only a temporary measure to combat the virus, and not indefinite. For example, the move to grant Hungary’s Viktor Orban sweeping powers has no end date — thus raising concerns about the purpose of such measures when Hungary is currently less affected than other regions of the world and in light of Orban’s general penchant for authoritarianism.

    Second, measures to combat the virus should be proportional to the aim and narrowly tailored to reach that outcome. In the case of the US Department of Justice debate as to whether federal terrorism laws can be applied to those who intentionally spread the virus, while that could act as a potent tool for charging those who actually seek to weaponize the virus as a biological agent, there is the potential for misapplication to lower-level offenders who cough in the wrong direction or bluff about their coronavirus-positive status. The application of laws should be carefully defined so that prosecutors do not extend the boundaries of these charges in a way that over-criminalizes.

    Third, countries should stop arresting and silencing whistleblowers and critics of a government’s Covid-19 response. Not only does this infringe on freedom of expression and the public’s right to know what their governments are doing to combat the virus, it is also unhelpful from a public health perspective. Prisons, jails and places of detention around the world are already overcrowded, unsanitary and at risk of being “superspreaders” of the virus — there is no need to add to an at-risk carceral population, particularly for non-violent offenses.

    Fourth, the collectors of big data should be more open and transparent with users whose data is being collected. Proposals about sharing a person’s coronavirus status with those around them with the aid of smartphone data should bring into clear focus, for everyone, just what privacy issues are at stake with big tech’s data collection practices.

    And finally, a plan of action should be put in place for how to move to an online voting system for the US elections in November 2020, and in other critical election spots around the world. Bolivia already had to delay its elections, which were key to repairing its democracy in a transitional period following former President Evo Morales’s departure, due to a mandatory quarantine to slow the spread of Covid-19. Other countries, including the US, should take note and not find themselves flat-footed on election day.

    A lack of preparedness is what led to the current scale of this global crisis — our rights and democracies should not suffer as a result.


    #le_monde_d'après #stratégie_du_choc #11_septembre #coronavirus #covid-19 #pandémie #liberté #droits_humains #urgence #autoritarisme #terrorisme #privacy #temporaire #Hongrie #proportionnalité #liberté_d'expression #surveillance #big-data #données

    ping @etraces

    https://seenthis.net/messages/854864 via CDB_77

  • Migrants sue German state over mobile phone searches

    In Germany, three migrants from Syria, Afghanistan and Cameroon are suing the state for accessing personal data on their mobile phones. A civil rights group taking part in the action says the phone searches are a serious invasion of privacy.

    29-year-old Syrian Mohammad A. was recognized as a refugee in Germany in 2015. Four years later, the German Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), reviewed his case – without giving a specific reason. During the review, they carried out an evaluation of his smartphone.

    “Suddenly the #BAMF employee told me to hand over my mobile phone and unlock it,” said Mohammad A. in a statement published by the Berlin-based Society for Civil Rights (GFF). “I didn’t know what was happening. Nothing was explained to me. But I was afraid of being deported. So I gave him the mobile phone. It felt like I was handing over my whole life.”

    Under a law passed in 2017, German authorities can examine the mobile phones of asylum seekers who are unable to present a valid passport on arrival, in order to verify information provided regarding identity. But the GFF, which filed the lawsuits together with the three refugees, says this represents “a particularly serious and extensive encroachment on the privacy of those affected.”

    Law fails to uncover false information

    The law permitting phone searches was meant to prevent “asylum abuse”. As many of those who arrive in Germany after fleeing their home countries cannot present a valid passport, it was seen as an effective way to detect fraudulent claims. However, the GFF says that despite thousands of such mobile phone searches, hardly any have uncovered false information.

    The GFF also argues that asylum authorities do not ensure that core areas of the asylum seekers’ rights are protected. “The BAMF is disregarding the strict constitutional rules by which the state must abide when accessing personal data,” Lea Beckmann from the GFF told Reuters.

    According to the news agency, a spokesman for BAMF said it was aware that checking mobile data was an intrusion and every case was determined by strict rules. “A mobile phone is often the only, or a very important, source to establish the identity and nationality of people entering Germany without a passport or identification documents,” he said.

    Privacy, transparency concerns

    The GFF argues that BAMF should be using mobile phone reading as a last resort, and that there are other, less drastic, means of clarifying doubts about identity. Mobile phone readouts are also extremely error-prone, the organization claims.

    The BAMF has also been criticized over a lack of transparency. For example, according to the GFF, little is known about how the software used to read and analyze the information obtained from phones actually works.
    Similarly, Reuters reports, the World Refugee Council has warned that consent for data collection is rarely sought and refugees often do not know how their data is used.

    Mohammad A.’s case is pending before a local court in the northwestern German city of Hanover. The case of an Afghan woman aged about 37 was lodged in Berlin and that of a 25-year-old woman from Cameroon, in the southwestern city of Stuttgart. The GFF hopes that the cases will lead to a constitutional review of the legal basis for mobile phone data evaluation.


    #smartphone #données #Allemagne #justice #asile #migrations #réfugiés #surveillance #données_personnelles #téléphone_portable #identité #identification #procédure_d'asile #nationalité

    ping @etraces @karine4 @kg

    https://seenthis.net/messages/853006 via CDB_77